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ABSTRACT 
Author: Florian G. Jentsch 
Title: The Influence of Cross-Cultural Differences on the 
Interpretation and Understanding of Aircraft 
Passenger Safety Briefing Cards 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona 
Beach, Florida 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1992 
Aircraft passenger safety briefing cards are an important part of 
passenger safety education aboard commercial aircraft. The cards must be 
understood by all readers, regardless of age, gender, or culture. Related 
research indicates that passengers from different cultures might 
misunderstand the highly specialized instructions on safety cards. 
A self-developed test was administered to 172 students from four 
cultures (British, French, German, U.S.) at seven universities in five 
countries. Significant differences (p<0.05) according to culture were found for 
the interpretation of pictograms. Culture did also significantly influence the 
understanding of the color designating emergency exits in airplane floor 
lighting (p<0.01). European subjects selected green, while subjects from the 
U.S. chose red. Although significant differences were found in the design 
preferences for safety cards, these differences were not as hypothesized. 
The results indicate that the interpretation of safety information varies 
between cultures. Appropriate recommendations were made. 
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Introduction 
The Accident Record 
Travel aboard commercial airliners has become the safest mode of 
transportation. Fatal injuries per passenger mile are 12 times less likely to 
occur during commercial air travel than when travelling by automobile. In 
the United States alone, some 50,000 people die each year in car-related 
accidents (Goldstein, 1990). Approximately 1,000 people are killed in various 
forms of air transportation in one year in the U.S., most of them (> 95%) in 
general aviation. The number of people killed in commercial aviation 
accidents worldwide varies between approximately 300 and 2,000 per year 
(Taylor, 1989). Large fatal accidents are rare in commercial air transportation. 
Thus, a single accident with many fatalities can significantly increase the 
number of people killed in a particular year. 
To reduce the possibility of aircraft accidents even further, aircraft must 
pass a series of tests to ensure that their airframes, engines, and equipment 
are suitable for the aircraft's operations before being certified. Likewise, 
aviation personnel are trained and licensed in accordance with stringent rules 
and regulations. Procedures must be followed in every aspect of aviation to 
ensure safe and efficient air transportation. The focus in aviation, more than 
in any other mode of travel, is on safety. Yet, even the most sophisticated 
aircraft flown by the most experienced pilots have been involved in accidents, 
some of which were disastrous. 
Survival of Aircraft Accidents 
Although it is a common misconception within the public, most 
accidents of large jet airplanes and smaller commuter aircraft used by major 
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and regional airlines are survivable. In fact, in less than 14% of commercial 
aircraft accidents in the United States, somebody died (fatal accidents). The 
public perception was, however, that in 75% of airline accidents somebody 
aboard was killed (Barthelmes, 1985). According to the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a non-survivable accident is one during 
which (a) the fuselage of the aircraft is substantially damaged, or (b) the 
impact forces exceed human tolerances, or (c) the seatbelts and seat-restraint 
systems do not properly secure the passengers. Still, during accidents that 
were categorized as non-survivable, passengers did survive. 
If the majority of aircraft accidents are survivable and non-fatal, this 
means that passengers aboard an aircraft in most cases should be able to 
escape from an accident without fatal injuries or even without being 
physically harmed at all. Yet, many aircraft occupants who did survive the 
initial phases of an otherwise survivable accident unharmed were killed or 
severely injured by other subsequent factors. Passengers who were trapped 
inside an aircraft were killed by smoke inhalation, fire, or thermal exposure 
(Johnson, 1984). Thus, the means to successfully escape from an aircraft 
accident must be provided to the passengers. Emergency exits, exit slides, and 
life vests are only some of the required equipment installed in large 
commercial aircraft towards the goal of allowing aircraft occupants to survive 
after an initial accident. 
Passenger Safety Education 
No matter how sophisticated the equipment is, for it to be useful, 
passengers also must be able to use the provided hardware effectively. Yet, 
aircraft accident history shows that passengers exposed to emergency 
situations often were not able to perform the necessary survival tasks 
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correctly, e.g., donning life vests or oxygen masks, or opening emergency 
exits. Barthelmes (1985) cited one example in which only two of 53 passengers 
aboard a large commercial jet aircraft were able to don their oxygen mask 
correctly after a cabin depressurization occured. It has, however, also been 
shown that passengers who were well-informed of emergency procedures and 
the use of emergency equipment were more likely to react in a correct and 
timely manner during an accident than uninformed aircraft occupants (e.g., 
Johnson, 1984). These findings can be explained by fundamental 
psychological principles which state that human behavior during 
emergencies is directed by two different methodologies (Johnson, 1980): 
1. If people have learned how to answer an emergency beforehand, 
their response to that particular situation is less directed by conscious 
thinking than if the situation is new. Previously learned and practiced 
procedures are followed, leading to faster response times and lower error rates 
(Stewart-Morris, 1991). 
2. If, however, the situation faced is unprecedented, people must 
develop a new set of rules to follow. This process can be very time 
consuming, and it implies the possibility of serious errors, especially under 
considerable stress such as in a life-threatening situation. 
For the aforementioned reasons, passenger education regarding 
emergency procedures and the use of emergency equipment has become a 
vital part of safety precautions in commercial air transportation. In addition 
to oral briefings by crewmembers (i.e., flight attendants), video presentations, 
and placards, airlines are required by law (see Appendices A and B) to provide 
printed material to inform passengers of emergency procedures (Department 
of Transportation [DoT], 1992). This information is generally displayed on 
passenger safety information briefing cards which can usually be found in the 
seat pocket in front of the passenger. The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs) require these cards to be applicable only to the respective aircraft, and 
to show the location and operation of emergency exits and other related 
equipment (DoT, 1992). 
Advantages of Passenger Briefing Cards 
Unlike video presentations or crewmember briefings, the safety 
briefing cards are the only source of information available to the passenger at 
any time throughout the whole flight. Flight attendants are often occupied 
with other tasks, and video presentations usually are shown only once or, 
seldom, twice during a flight. 
Most accidents occur during three critical phases of flight: during take-
off and initial climb (23.5%), approach to land (45%), and landing (8%) 
(Lufthansa Jahrbuch, 1987). These statistics suggest that more than half of all 
aircraft accidents (53%) happen considerably after crewmember briefings or 
video presentations have been given. Long trans- and intercontinental 
nonstop flights frequently last up to 12 hours. In these cases, the time 
between the initial presentation of safety information and the point when 
this information needs to be recalled by a passenger during an approach or 
landing accident can be so long that many passengers might not be able to 
remember such information. This problem is aggravated by the fact that most 
aircraft passengers have no previous "hands-on" experience with the 
emergency equipment and procedures, whereas each crewmember of U.S. 
scheduled air carriers, for example, must perform the actual operation of 
emergency equipment at least once every 24 calender months (DoT, 1992). If a 
passenger decided to review the safety information, the only source accessible 
at any moment would be the safety card. The cards, therefore, must be as 
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effective as possible, i.e., convey to the passengers in the fastest and least 
misunderstandable way the information of how to perform the necessary 
tasks. 
Understanding of Safety Cards 
Current safety cards employ a variety of graphics technologies to 
transmit safety information to passengers. In addition to worded 
information, sometimes translated into several languages, pictorial display 
formats are used, such as photographs, drawings, or pictograms. According to 
the Dictionary of Psychology (Reber, 1985), a pictogram is "a picture or symbol 
used to represent an object or a concept" (p. 548). Thus, pictograms differ 
from realistic drawings in being substantially simplified (e.g., they omit all 
supplemental graphic information unnecessary to represent the object or 
concept). Pictograms, as well as photographs and languages, are only 
meaningful if the reader "recognizes a previously seen shape or has learned 
the signification of a conventional shape" (Bertin, 1983, p. 51). This 
symbolism involved in understanding the depicted safety information 
requires a certain amount of common previous experiences and knowledge 
among the passengers (e.g., in the recognition of pictograms). 
A common core of experiences among aircraft occupants is difficult to 
assume, since today's air travel is truly international. In 1989, more than 1.1 
billion passengers traveled on scheduled air carriers worldwide (Lufthansa 
Jahrbuch, 1990). Passengers come from many different countries even on 
domestic flights. The languages and cultural backgrounds of aircraft 
occupants are often extremely diversified. Yet, all passengers must be 
addressed when presenting safety information. Since safety briefing cards 
play an important role in passenger safety education, they must be 
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understood by every reader, regardless of age, previous experience, native 
language, or culture. The Dictionary of Psychology (Reber, 1985) defines the 
term "culture" as: 
The system of information that codes the manner in which the people 
in an organized group, society or nation interact with their social and 
physical environment. In this sense the term is really used so that the 
frame of reference is the set of rules, regulations, mores and methods 
of interaction within the group. . . . each member must learn the 
systems and the structures (p. 170). 
The graphics technologies employed on aircraft passenger safety cards 
require recognition of abstract information based on previous experiences or a 
previous frame of reference. Thus, questions arise whether interpretation 
and understanding of safety briefing cards are influenced by varying cultural 
backgrounds. Do two aircraft passengers from different countries who each 
speak a different language comprehend instructions in two separate ways 
because of their culture? If so, are the differences so great that they might 
constitute a danger to safety? Which symbols are universally recognized, and 
which are misunderstandable? Do people from various countries have 
different preferences of how information should be presented? 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how the information on 
passenger safety briefing cards is understood and interpreted by subjects from 
different cultural and geographical backgrounds. Several features of current 
aircraft safety cards were tested for their overall effectiveness among 
university students from Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The probable outcome of the subjects' answers in a 
real emergency was compared to their previous aviation experiences, their 
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gender, and their cultural background to determine whether culture has a 
significant influence on the understanding of briefing cards. 
This study could serve as a basis for further investigation into cross-
cultural aspects of passenger safety education. Areas to be studied could 
include differences in attention to safety presentations, or possible benefits of 
individualized video presentations in multiple languages. 
Review of the Related Literature 
Benefits of Passenger Safety Briefing Cards 
There is a need to convey safety information to all occupants of 
commercial aircraft. The NTSB stated in 1974 that the percentage of 
passengers injured during mishaps who had not read the passenger safety 
briefing card was three times as great as that for those who had read the card 
(Altman, 1975a). Johnson (1972) found that inaction or wrong reaction after 
aircraft accidents were considerably lower among passengers who had 
received specific and understandable safety information. Additionally, 
passengers who were informed of the emergency exits and evacuation 
procedures were able to act according to a plan, leading to higher probabilities 
of survival after an aircraft accident. Pre-planning and quick action were 
important factors common to those passengers who survived major aircraft 
accidents, such as the runway collision at Tenerife in 1977 or the post-landing 
fire of a twin-jet in Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 2, 1983 (Barthelmes, 1985). In 
fact, Johnson (1984) cited several examples of passengers who attributed their 
survival solely to the fact that they had followed the pre-departure briefing 
and read the safety card. 
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Previous Studies of Safety Card Designs 
Previous investigations into the effectiveness of aircraft passenger 
briefing cards focused exclusively on subjects from a single country, although 
the problem of educating passengers from different cultures had been 
recognized (Altman, 1974a; Edwards, 1990). The effectiveness of passenger 
safety briefing cards can be measured using different approaches. Johnson 
(1985), whose Interaction Research Corporation (IRC™) has been designing 
about 50% of the safety cards aboard U.S. airliners (Brooks, 1986), has 
conducted regular studies regarding the effectiveness of briefing card designs. 
At IRC, safety cards were redesigned until a 90% level of understanding was 
achieved by subjects who were not continuously involved in air 
transportation (Lundstrom, 1988). Two basic methods for the test of safety 
card designs have been employed: 
1. Behavioral tests investigate a subject's ability to perform a specific 
task after receiving safety information, e.g., donning oxygen masks after 
reading the respective part on a passenger safety briefing card. Although these 
tests carry a high validity, since they actually require a subject to perform the 
safety-related task, behavioral tests necessitate complex and somewhat time-
consuming testing procedures. Only a limited sample of the population can 
be tested, and the tests are mostly restricted to a single task, 
2. Conceptual tests are the more often used approach: Various designs 
and certain features of safety cards are shown by trained interviewers to test-
participants who then attempt to interpret and verbally describe the depicted 
information. While conceptual tests do not require the subjects to physically 
execute the tasks depicted on the cards, they allow a substantially higher 
number of subjects to be tested over a greater variety of tasks. 
9 
Altman (1974b) used the behavioral approach to investigate the 
effectiveness of safety card designs on life jacket donning. The study was 
limited to U.S. subjects and revealed procedural problems with regard to the 
depiction of the various steps in life jacket donning. The findings were 
supported by Johnson, Blom, and Altman (1975) who investigated the 
effectiveness of video presentations on the same task of life jacket donning 
using the conceptual test method. It was concluded that nonverbal 
presentation of safety information yields considerable benefits over worded 
instructions when properly tested. In this study, age had no significant 
influence on the answers, while gender and previous flight experience did 
influence the amount of correct interpretations: Men did interpret the 
presented pictures more correct than women, and more experienced 
passengers also had an increased knowledge of safety procedures. 
Johnson and Altman (1973) studied the influence of various safety card 
designs on passenger behavior when using emergency escape slides. The 
correct procedure of leaving an airplane via an emergency slide is to jump 
onto the slide instead of sitting down at the door and then sliding down the 
chute. Subjects received different instructions: With no briefing card, 59.9% 
of the subjects jumped onto the slide; with a briefing card instructing the 
passengers to jump, 67.8% did in fact jump, while the highest jump ratio 
(73.5%) was achieved when subjects received a briefing card telling the 
passengers to "jump don't sit" (p. 215). In a separate analysis of the data, no 
significant differences due to the subjects' gender were found. 
Finnair, the state airline of Finland, conducted a conceptual test of a 
safety card before introducing the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 into their fleet 
(Paajanen, 1991). To simulate naive subjects, 112 Finnish schoolchildren 
between the ages of 11 and 12 years were asked in open-ended questions to 
answer in writing what they thought was meant by each presented part of the 
safety card. The design exclusively used drawings and pictograms. The 
results of the study supported earlier findings regarding the design of safety 
cards, such as the fact that the introduction of perspectively correct drawings 
can be clarifying (Altman, Johnson, & Blom, 1970). Another outcome of the 
study was the finding that pictorial representations without any explanatory 
words could be misleading. Many children mistook the drawing of a 
uniformed flight attendant opening one exit, while a non-uniformed person 
opened a different exit, for a separation of doors available to passengers and 
crewmembers. Thus, if confronted with an emergency evacuation, these 
children would probably not use the exit depicted with the uniformed 
crewmember. This could lead to serious blockages, delays, and even the loss 
of lives. 
In 1987, Schmidt and Kysor published the results of two studies which 
they conducted to investigate the appeal and effectiveness of safety briefing 
cards on U.S. students and government employees. The subjects, 10 human 
factors professionals and 15 regular commercial airline passengers were asked 
to rank 33 sample briefing cards in the order of their perceived effectiveness. 
While the highest-ranked cards used more pictures, more colors, and were 
comparably larger, they also used a minimum amount of words integrated 
with pictures. In addition to the first test, 25 government employees were 
given one card each and received an oral briefing. After the briefing was 
completed, the subjects had to answer specific questions regarding safety 
procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of the cards. Schmidt and Kysor 
concluded that those briefing cards which used sketches and drawings instead 
of photographs and that followed general recommendations were more 
effective than those which did not have these features. These results 
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corroborated with other research regarding aircraft passenger safety cards (e.g., 
Altman, Johnson, & Blom, 1970; Johnson 1984, 1985). Johnson (1980) 
recommended a detailed, pictorial, and four-colored card without photos. A 
photograph is less effective than a well-designed drawing, because the photo 
also shows unnecessary details, creating clutter and "visual noise" 
(Lundstrom, 1988, p. 39; Dwyer, 1967). Additionally, the cards should be 
independent from the reader's language or reading capability by using 
pictograms rather than words. Long and complicated sentences should be 
avoided and replaced by short instructions in basic English. "Omit reasons 
why, concentrate on procedures" (Schmidt & Kysor, 1987, p. 51). Altman, 
Johnson, and Blom (1970) preceded Schmidt and Kysor (1987) with a similar 
study: Twenty-two then-current passenger safety briefing cards were ranked 
in two separate tests by psychology students and human factors specialists 
according to their effectiveness. Edwards (1990) summarized the findings 
from these tests within the following guidelines for effective card design: 
1. Pictures with a minimum of descriptive words alone are more 
acceptable than pictures alone, words alone, or pictures with a large 
number of descriptive words. 
2. A realistic understandable picture of good quality is preferable to an 
abstract drawing. 
3. Where a sequence of actions is called for, two or more numbered 
pictures are desirable. 
4. A simple, uncluttered, systematically-organized card format 
enhances acceptance by the reader (p. 184). 
Although none of the cited studies specifically addressed international 
subjects, one result from both behavioral and conceptual tests (e.g., Altman, 
Johnson, & Blom, 1970) was the recommendation of culture free methods of 
conveying safety information (Altman, 1975b). Basic guidelines for culture 
free techniques have been published by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) and the U.S. Society of Automotive Engineers (NTSB, 
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1985). The use of pictorial representations instead of worded instructions has 
been encouraged. Johnson, Blom, and Altman (1975) expressed their "hope 
that such information displays may be understood by people from all the 
major language groups in the world" (p. 107). If words were necessary to 
explain a fact or idea, the translation into several languages was 
recommended. These recommendations, however, are very limited and 
allow a considerable range of alternatives in the design of safety cards. 
Current Aircraft Passenger Information Cards 
In a 1985 safety study, the NTSB compared 80 different briefing cards 
from 13 U.S. airlines. It was concluded that already the U.S. cards varied 
significantly not only in form, size, and outer appearance, but also in the 
conveyed information. When comparing U.S. safety cards for their tests, 
Schmidt and Kysor (1987) distinguished five distinctively different card 
design methods, such as "mostly words," "words plus diagrams," "mostly 
diagrams," etc. (p. 54). Some authors (e.g., Schmidt & Kysor, 1987) attributed 
these differences to factors such as novelty to catch the readers' interest or the 
production of safety cards for specific audiences. The NTSB (1985) stated that 
a lack of standardization among the cards was also a result of the limited 
regulatory guidance with respect to passenger safety briefing cards. 
In the U.S., Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) govern the design and contents of safety cards (See 
Appendices A and B), together with the respective Advisory Circulars (ACs). 
The most stringent regulations regarding safety cards are stipulated by FAR 
121.571 and the accompanying AC121-24A Passenger safety information and 
briefing cards (DoT, 1989). Yet, neither a standard format nor special testing of 
the cards are required. Additionally, no provisions have been made to 
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address non-English speaking passengers except for the recommendation that 
the use of international symbols is encouraged. In fact, after a new regulation 
came into effect limiting exit-row seating, some airlines incorporated this 
information on their cards by printing it solely in English, including the 
statement in the center of the card advising the - potentially illiterate or non-
English speaking - readers that they should notify a crewmember and be 
reseated if "you do not read English well enough to understand the 
instructions on this card or do not understand oral crew commands in 
English" (Comair, 1990, p. 1). 
Safety Card Sample 
To get an overview of currently used aircraft passenger safety briefing 
cards, U.S. and international airlines were solicited at various airports in the 
U.S. and Europe for current safety card samples. Eighty-two cards from 29 
airlines and aircraft manufacturers were collected. Of those 82 cards, 72 were 
applicable to large transport category jet aircraft. The other ten cards pertained 
to turbopropeller-driven commuter aircraft. Tables 1 and 2 show the origin of 
those cards pertaining to jet aircraft according to type, operator, and 
geographical area. 
The sample taken was not intended to be statistically representative. 
Eleven U.S. airlines were contained in the group of jet aircraft operators. The 
ten represented European airlines came from France, Germany (3), Iceland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and the U.K. Three 
airlines from Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong were represented among 
the Asian operators. Further information about the cards in the sample can 
be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 1 
Safety Cards in the Sample. Number of Cards by Aircraft Type. 
Jet Aircraft only 
Aircraft Type (Family) 
Airbus A300 
Airbus A310 
Airbus A320 
Boeing B727 
Boeing B737 
Boeing B747 
Boeing B757 
Boeing B767 
Fokker F100 
Lockheed L-1011 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 
McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 
McDonnell-Douglas MD-80 
Total Different 
Cards 
Total 
4 
6 
1 
14 
10 
8 
2 
4 
2 
4 
11 
2 
2 
2 
72 
Between the beginning of acquiring the cards and the preparation of 
the final copy of this study, two of the U.S. airlines included in the sample 
(Eastern Airlines® and Pan American®) ceased to operate. Two other U.S. 
airlines (TWA® and United Airlines®) changed the design of their safety 
cards considerably within this time frame, and their new cards were added to 
the samples. 
Table 2 
Safety Cards in the Sample. Number of Operators Represented by Aircraft 
Type and by Region, jet Aircraft only 
Aircraft Family 
and Type 
Airbus A300 
Airbus A310 
Airbus A320 
Boeing B727 
Boeing B737 
Boeing B747 
Boeing B757 
Boeing B767 
Fokker F100 
Lockheed L-10U 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 
McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 
McDonnell-Douglas MD-80 
Total Different 
U.S. 
1 
2 
8 
6 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
5 
1 
1 
2 
11 
Operators 
Europe 
1 
2 
1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
Asia 
1 
1 
-
-
-
2 
-
-
3 
Total 
3 
5 
1 
8 
10 
7 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
2 
2 
2 
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All safety cards contained information about the location and 
operation of emergency exits, exit slides, and emergency exit lighting, as well 
as instructions regarding the use of supplemental oxygen and floatation 
devices (i.e., life vests or floatation cushions). The cards were sorted by the 
researcher according to their primary means of communicating safety 
information following the categorization proposed by Schmidt and Kysor 
(1985): 
16 
1. No cards used mostly words. 
2. Words plus diagrams (i.e., drawings and pictograms) were the 
primary means of conveying information on 10 cards. All cards in 
this category came from a single U.S. operator (Delta Air Lines®). 
3. Twelve cards used words integrated with diagrams. In contrast to 
the technique employed for the cards in category 2, these cards had 
descriptive texts directly incorporated into the drawings, not as a 
separate entry. 
4. Mostly diagrams were found on 32 cards. 
5. Instead of using diagrams, 18 cards used photos, sometimes photos 
combined with text. The cards from the sample that fell into this 
category originated from four U.S. air carriers (American®, 
Eastern®, Northwest®, and United®) and one European airline 
(Swissair®). 
Sixty-eight cards in the sample used color to convey safety information 
(i.e., the use of color was not restricted to the frame on the card or the airline's 
logo), while four cards (all from Northwest Airlines®) were monochrome. 
Multiple languages were found on 48 cards from 16 airlines. Only 12 airlines, 
however, used different languages to transmit safety information. In all 
other cases, the designation of the card was the only part translated into 
different languages. 
As indicated earlier, several airlines changed the design of their cards 
during the collection of the sample. However, no clear trend could be 
determined: While one U.S. airline (United®) did change their design from 
photos to diagrams integrated with words, another U.S. airline (TWA®) 
changed it from mostly diagrams to photos. Lufthansa® German Airlines 
incorporated words into their previous design which had used diagrams only. 
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Further analysis of the cards revealed distinct differences in certain 
areas: Thirty-eight cards from 17 airlines were pertaining to over-wing exits 
with removable exit doors and offered an option of where to put the door 
once it was removed from the frame during an emergency evacuation. Of 
these 38 cards, 
1. Eight cards from three airlines proposed to put the door on the seats 
in the exit row. 
2. Eight cards from nine airlines favored to throw the door outside 
through the exit. 
3. Nineteen cards from seven airlines advised the passengers to put 
the exit door on the seats behind the exit row. 
4. Two cards from two airlines showed the door in the row in front of 
the exit row. 
5. On one card, the exit door was placed on a seat row adjacent to the 
exit row. 
Other significant differences were found between the instructions of 
whether to wear shoes during an emergency evacuation via the escape slides. 
The three German airlines represented in the sample required generally that 
shoes should be taken off. Thirty-eight cards from 16 airlines used depictions 
of high-heel shoes only. The rest of the cards (22 from five U.S. airlines) did 
not specify this area. 
The lack of standardization among aircraft passenger briefing cards as 
found in the sample is aggravated on the international scale by different 
regulations in most countries. In Germany, for example, the guidelines 
require safety cards to inform about the location and operation of emergency 
exits and life preservers, as well as about the supplemental oxygen system, if it 
is installed (Bundesverkehrsministerium, 1987). No specifications, 
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however, are made regarding how the "appropriate . . . placards and printed 
instructions" ["geeignete Hilfsmittel in der Form von Hinweisschildern und 
gedruckten Anweisungen"] (p. 673) should be designed. Due to the actual 
differences in card design, the NTSB (1985) proposed additional research in 
the area of passenger safety education. 
Cross-cultural Communication 
While the question of cross-cultural communication of safety 
information has found comparably little attention for aircraft, it has been the 
focus in other areas of transportation. Airports, for example, make use of an 
international signage system for passenger guidance and information (Air 
Transport Association of America, Airport Operators Council International, 
& American Association of Airport Executives, 1985; Cook & Smith, 1980), 
using pictograms to convey information to people from various countries. 
Effective communication and the understanding of information 
depend upon a common basis between the communicator (i.e., the person 
who wants to convey the information) and the receiver (i.e., the person for 
whom the information is intended) (Casse, 1981; DoT, 1977). A common basis 
can consist of shared experiences, the same language, etc. Such factors can 
usually be found among people who grew up and lived within the same 
culture (Schneller, 1989). If the sender and the receiver, however, come from 
different cultures, the probability of missed or failed communication is 
increased. In today's truly international air travel, where every place in the 
world can be reached by airplane within 36 hours, potential passengers come 
from very diversified cultural backgrounds and speak more than 2,800 
languages (Collins, 1982). Thus, the passengers' common basis for successful 
communication is minimized. 
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The use of signs and pictorial representations to transmit ideas is part 
of nonverbal communication, in contrast to verbal communication which 
uses words and language. According to Morain (1987), nonverbal 
communication can employ body language, object language (e.g., signs, 
clothing), or environmental language (lighting, color, architecture). As has 
been stated earlier, the interpretation of pictograms and realistic drawings 
involves the process of symbolism. Combinations of shapes and /or color 
produce a meaningful pictorial representation only, if "one recognizes a 
previously seen shape or has learned the signification of a conventional 
shape" (Bertin, 1983, p. 51). Bertin concluded that the signification of a shape 
is never unmistakable: 
Indeed, even the most recognizable shapes can suggest numerous 
meanings. A horse's head can just as easily correspond to a race track, a 
stable, a stud farm, a riding school, a bridal path, a horse butcher, a glue 
factory, a harness factory, a chess game, etc. The cross, "symbol" par 
excellence, allows students armed with bad maps to imagine New York 
as garnished with cemeteries: The fine black crosses of the cemeteries 
and the fine red crosses designating monuments are similar at first 
glance! 
There is no universal shape signification. The meaning of a 
symbol becomes familiar to us only by habit; through the repetition of a 
similar situation. A shape can become a symbol only within a 
restricted domain, rigorously defined and previously familiar to the 
observer (p. 95). 
Some symbols have a more universal signification than others. This is 
especially true for colors as symbols of natural objects: Throughout the world, 
human beings perceive red as a symbol of fire, blue for water, or green for 
vegetation. However, if they never experienced a natural phenomenon, such 
as ice or snow, people might not be able to interpret a picture of white 
mountains. Other color symbolisms, on the other hand, are strictly related to 
particular cultures. Death is symbolized by black is western societies, while 
the respective color is white in parts of the orient. Exit signs in buildings are 
green in most parts of Europe, while they are red in the U.S., etc. 
Thus, when using color and /or shapes as a code on symbols, it is 
mandatory to select pictorial representations which are constant and 
intuitively meaningful to potential readers. The purpose of a symbol is not 
fulfilled if its meaning changes easily with small changes in its connotation: 
"A shape can become a symbol only within a restricted domain, rigorously 
defined and previously familiar to the observer. However, we must 
recognize that modern information tends to mix different domains and 
hinder such familiarity!" (Bertin, 1983, p. 95) An aircraft floating on water, for 
example, can have two completely different meanings: When the symbol is 
used on a map, it most likely designates a seaplane landing area, while its 
meaning on a safety card is: In case of emergency landing on water. 
The two different meanings of the plane on water are a typical case of 
what Schneller (1989) defined as "misunderstanding": "The addressee 
attributes a certain meaning rooted in his own individual pool of knowledge 
to the sender's signal or sign. But this meaning attribution differs, or even 
contradicts, the sender's intention when he/she encodes the message" 
(p. 467). Non-understanding, on the other hand, entails a lack of any 
connotation of a given signal, since the symbol does not exist in the receiver's 
knowledge. A misunderstanding can be more serious than non-
understanding, since the receiver assumes to have correctly understood the 
message. Acting accordingly, the receiver might actually contradict the 
sender's intention. Parker (1988) noted that "illustrations can cause even 
more cultural problems than text. [Readers] . . . see illustrations immediately 
and react to them more strongly than to a written mistake buried in a 
thousands of words" (p. 1). 
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Cross-cultural Studies on Communication 
Cultural differences were the focus of a study by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses (Sinaiko, Guthrie, & Abbott, 1969) regarding U.S. military 
and technical aid for the Republic of Vietnam. From previous studies, the 
authors concluded that there were "no inherent limits to the absorption of 
technical information and the acquisition of new skills" (p. 1) in any culture. 
Except for physical stature, culture was found to be learned, rather than 
biologically determined (Reber, 1985). Therefore, cultural differences were 
most pronounced in habit patterns, such as allocation of time, reluctance or 
wish to assume responsibility, or planning (or lack of it). Learning habits 
were found to vary according to cultural factors, e.g., the preference for 
learning by rote and imitation in some cultures. Therefore, standards of one 
culture for cross-cultural communication would not necessarily be applicable 
to another culture. 
While cross-cultural differences in the understanding of verbal and 
body language have been widely demonstrated (e.g., Hall, 1977; Hall & Hall, 
1990; Morain, 1987; Schneller, 1989), investigations into cross-cultural 
variances in the perception of pictorial material have been rather sparse. 
Miller (1973) reviewed previous research in the topic. Most of the cited 
studies were conducted by Europeans in Africa. In congruence with previous 
findings, Miller (1973) hypothesized that "cultural differences in responses to 
certain types of pictorial representations are reflections of differences in 
experiences with the techniques or conventions utilized in such 
representations, rather than differences in actual visual experiences in the 
three-dimensional world" (p. 136). Some subjects who lacked previous 
experience with photographs, for example, did devote the bulk of their 
attention on the geometrical contour and the white edges of a photograph 
rather than focusing on the depicted object. "Once the individual is able to 
grasp the idea that a photograph or picture represents an object, he has 
learned to use one set of cues . . . to expect to see an object when presented 
with a picture" (Miller, 1973, p. 138). Yet, in another study cited by Miller, the 
subjects had more difficulty to recognize local, but unfamiliar animals from 
photos than familiar ones. 
Mangan (1978) noted that the understanding and interpretation of 
pictorial representations was also dependent upon the extent to which a 
particular culture used graphics communication. In some traditional Islamic 
societies, for example, iconic representation was prohibited. Thus, it was 
concluded, it might be beneficially in some cultures not to use pictures at all 
to convey information. The perspective used to depict a certain object 
changed considerably among cultures, from the pseudo three-dimensional 
Western perspective, to a "fold-out" view showing all sides of an object in 
one picture, as used by some African and native American cultures. Other 
research cited by Mangan indicated that training and previous experiences 
allowed people to understand pictorial representations which were 
previously unfamiliar to them. An otherwise illiterate navigator from 
Micronesia was able to instantaneously understand a complicated U.S. 
navigational chart since his reference system (celestial objects) mirrored the 
one used for the production of the map. Mangan concluded that "visual 
images are far from self-explanatory. Accurate interpretation of such images 
involves the learning of conventions . . . " (p. 266). ". . . what one sees in a 
picture, will to a large degree depend on whether one's cultural environment 
(a) is in possession of pictures and (b) places emphasis on acquiring the ability 
to perceive what they depict" (p. 247). 
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To illustrate the problems caused by lack of previous experiences, 
Oborne (1987) cited Barnard and Marcel (1983) who employed the example of 
a penguin used to imply frozen goods. As Oborne pointed out, people who 
lacked previous experience with or had never seen a penguin might not be 
able to make the inferential connection between the symbol and the object it 
symbolized. In another study, Zambian children had more problems to 
identify a pig from a picture than Scottish children, while the opposite was 
true when the children were presented with a picture of a hippopotamus 
(Miller, 1973). Parker (1988) noted cultural sensibilities towards the use of 
certain illustrations. Gender and skin color of people, or certain animals 
depicted in graphics, were considered to be inappropriate or prejudiced 
according to cultural experiences. Thus, it was concluded that in order to 
effectively relay a certain message to receivers from different cultures, 
pictorial representations should be as unambiguous as possible and draw 
from a common core of previous experiences among the readers. 
Americans, British, French, and Germans: 
General Cultural Differences in Communication Styles 
Although sharing a long common history and heritage, general 
cultural differences have been observed between the United States and 
Western Europe, as well as within Western Europe (e.g., Dreyfuss, 1970; 
Green & Pew, 1978; Hall & Hall, 1990; Heard, 1974; Lanier, 1973; Taylor, 1990): 
Often Germans seem stiff and pompous to Americans while 
Americans seem sloppy and superficial to Germans. The French think 
Americans are enthusiastic but lacking in style; Americans feel the 
French take forever to get down to business. Germans think the 
French are not serious enough; the French think the Germans lack 
sophistication. 
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In fact, each country simply has its own way of seeing and doing 
things, based on unstated rules, and these hidden differences often 
make cooperation difficult. (Hall & Hall, 1990, p. xiii) 
Hall (1977) introduced the concept of high- and low-context cultures. 
In a high-context culture, much of the communication is rooted in long-
standing traditions and takes place through unspoken hints, such as gestures. 
Thus, communication does not require a large amount of additional 
background data. Conversely, people from a low-context culture need as 
many additional information as possible to communicate. In a low-context 
culture, information is compartmentalized and not flowing freely from one 
person to another. Thus, the low-context person is accustomed to be 
provided with a large amount of background knowledge, from which the 
necessary information is derived: "High-context people are . . . apt to become 
impatient and irritated when low-context people insist on giving them 
information they don't need. Conversely, low-context people are at a loss 
when high-context people do not provide enough information (Hall & Hall, 
1990, p. 9). 
While the French are considered to be people of high context, Germans 
are supposedly the exact opposite (Hall & Hall, 1990); Americans and the 
British are considered to be between the two extremes, even if more towards 
the low-context side. Therefore, Germans want detailed information and 
need a highly-defined context when communicating. Communication must 
be well-defined, and Germans tend to take longer to convey a particular 
message than their French counterparts. This can be documented by the 
language and sentence structure in German: Words in German are generally 
more exact in meaning than for example in English (Hall & Hall, 1990). 
German writers always took pride in a long-sentenced and complicated style 
(e.g., Emmanuel Kant). Short sentences are regarded as simplistic in 
Germany and as a sign of lacking writing capability. Each German noun has 
one of three different genders, and the articles and adjectives must conform. 
Germans must include extra accuracy in their verbal communication to 
satisfy the need for special information. 
The French, on the other hand, do convey a large amount of 
information through non-verbal communication, such as body language 
(Taylor, 1990). Therefore, a personal appointment is much more appreciated 
in France than a telephone conversation or an impersonal letter (Hall & Hall, 
1990). With the need for immediate human contacts comes an emphasis of 
style and form. The French are very focused on the correct and sophisticated 
use of their language, and are very articulate (Lanier, 1973). 
Hall and Hall (1990) documented the variances in contexting by the 
form and contents of advertisements in France, Germany, and the U.S.: 
German ads are loaded with detailed information; products are 
described and analyzed. . . . Ads are examined and picked apart . . . 
Good advertising strategies in Germany take into account that 
Germans are both print-oriented and very literal-minded. . . . print ads 
convey information rather than evoke a mood or appeal to sublimal 
emotions and desires. . . . The constant changes, the lack of continuity, 
the hyperbole and flamboyance [in U.S. advertising] - all puzzle and 
annoy [Germans] (p. 71 ff). 
Germans ads, however, are often perceived as dull and boring - even by 
Germans themselves. Hall and Hall continued: 
While the function of German advertising is to transmit 
information, the function of a French ad is to release responses - two 
entirely different functions. French advertising is high-context. It is 
based on product name recognition. . . . French ads are designed to be 
visually attractive and eye-catching. This fits the French visual 
orientation to life and reflects their sensitivity to aesthetics, color, and 
design. . . . An ad that is effective in the U.S. [, however,] will not 
necessarily be effective in France (p. 127f). 
French advertisement does regularly win international prizes for artistic style 
and ingenuity, and samplers of French television ads are popular in German 
movie theaters for being entertaining - not for their marketing message. 
U.S. advertisement is in marked contrast to the German idea of 
detailed information and the French preference for feelings. 
Although ads in the United States may contain information, it is 
seldom detailed and is usually a bolster for the claims of product 
superiority. Exaggerated claims that a product is the best, newest, most 
fashionable, or finest are effective in the U.S. but would be both 
offensive and illegal in West Germany and would win no awards in 
France (Hall & Hall, 1990, p. 169). 
As mentioned before, the British way of marketing communication is 
between the extremes. British advertisement can be extremely informative, 
yet it also can be of outrageous British black humor. Additionally, since U.S. 
advertisements do not need to be translated for the United Kingdom, the 
British are also exposed to a large amount of U.S. advertisement. 
Americans, British, French, and Germans: 
Differences in the Use of Technical Signs 
As has been shown, one can distinguish between three distinct 
communication styles for France, Germany, and the U.S. Great Britain, yet 
distinct and deeply rooted in its own history, combines certain parts of the 
three styles, making it a well-defined reference point. Communication of 
marketing information varied considerably depending on culture. Germans, 
for example, preferred a wealth of printed information, while French readers 
chose advertisements which were focused more on graphics design. 
The reviewed literature did not indicate that the influence of the three 
aforementioned communication styles on the interpretation and 
understanding of aircraft passenger safety cards has previously been 
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investigated. Considerable cross-cultural differences regarding the 
understanding of automotive symbols, however, have been found during 
tests in the U.S. and Western Europe (e.g., Dreyfuss, 1970; Green and Pew, 
1978; Heard, 1974). Automobile transportation is comparable to air travel in 
several respects. Cars and aircraft were developed approximately at the same 
time. Both modes of transportation have given sets of technical and legal 
rules which are comparable in most countries in the world. Yet, the studies 
indicated distinct differences between British, French, German, and U.S. 
subjects regarding the use of highway and automotive signs. It was concluded 
from the tests that the interpretation of automotive symbols in Europe and in 
the U.S. varied considerably according to cultural traditions and local 
automotive standards set during the first 40 years of automobile 
development. 
Collins (1982) summarized previous research in the use of symbols for 
highway signs, automotive and machinery applications, hazard warnings, as 
well as information symbols for buildings. Based upon findings such as that 
exit signs in buildings are red in the U.S. while they are green in France and 
Germany, the need for standardization and effective testing was emphasized, 
especially with regard to the increasing number of international travellers. 
Summary 
Aircraft passengers who are well-informed of safety procedures and the 
use of emergency equipment are more likely to survive an accident 
unharmed than uninformed occupants. Passenger safety information 
briefing cards are one method of conveying safety information to aircraft 
passengers. Current regulations, however, allow substantial differences 
between different safety cards. A sample of current safety cards revealed 
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distinct differences not only between the cards from different countries, but 
also between the cards from a single country. 
Safety card designs that are using pictorial displays have been found to 
be more effective than those cards using worded instructions. However, even 
among cards solely using pictograms, considerable differences can be found. 
To understand a picture or symbol, a person needs to have learned the 
meaning of the symbol, or must have had previous experiences with the 
depicted object or concept. Traditions and cultural backgrounds can lead to 
differences in understanding pictorial information by users from different 
cultural backgrounds. 
Three different communication styles were defined: The high-context 
French style conveys a large proportion of information through non-verbal 
channels with a preference for visual communication. Germans, being of 
very low context and thus on the other end of the spectrum, are very print-
oriented and need considerable background information to successfully 
communicate. Americans, while being more low- than high-context people, 
are short and to the point. Although they can get bored by too much 
information, they hesitate to make decisions without a sufficient background. 
The British, while distinct, share characteristics with all three groups and can 
therefore serve as a reference point. Although the influence of these 
differences on the interpretation of aircraft passenger safety cards has not been 
studied before, previous investigations with regard to the use of symbols in 
buildings and cars revealed distinct differences. 
Statement of the Hypotheses 
Different cultures may use different symbols for depicting the same 
situation, process, or object (Dreyfuss, 1972). It was therefore hypothesized 
29 
that there are significant differences in the understanding and interpretation 
of current passenger safety briefing cards among subjects with different 
cultural backgrounds. It was also hypothesized that culture will have a 
stronger influence than gender, educational background, or previous flight 
experience. Based on the three previously defined communication styles, 
four detailed hypotheses were developed which state that individual cultural 
differences exist in the interpretation of safety cards between subjects from 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. These cultural 
differences are more pronounced than the within-group differences such as 
gender or previous flight experience. The null-hypotheses for the following 
research hypotheses would always be: There is no significant difference 
between cultures in this particular respect. 
Hypothesis I 
Due to their low-context communication style, Germans prefer printed 
advertisements with detailed information. French advertisements are more 
focused on graphics, since the French are very sensitive towards color and 
design. It was hypothesized that, when being asked about their preferences in 
designing a safety card, French subjects indicate a higher preference for 
graphic stimuli such as drawings and color than German subjects who choose 
more worded instructions. 
Hypothesis II 
Photos were found to be used relatively widely on safety cards from the 
U.S. It was hypothesized that, when asked about their preferences on safety 
card design features, U.S. subjects indicate a significantly higher preference for 
photos than French, German, and British subjects. 
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Hypothesis III 
Emergency exits are marked red in the United States and green in wide 
parts of Europe. It was hypothesized that, when asked about the colors used 
to denote aircraft emergency exits, European subjects choose green, while U.S. 
subjects choose red over other colors. 
Hypothesis IV 
The high-context French are strongly oriented towards visual stimuli. 
Germans with their low-context culture are supposed to be more susceptible 
to worded information. It was hypothesized that, when interpreting complex 
pictorial representations, the number of correct answers varies between 
subjects according to their culture. 
Method 
Subjects 
One-hundred-and-seventy-two students were employed at seven 
universities in five countries. The students came from entire classes selected 
by local contacts (i.e., professors and teaching assistants) at the following 
universities: 
1. Twenty students from the Intitue Don Bosco, Warcoing, Belgium 
(Don Bosco). 
2. Nineteen students from the Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile, 
Toulouse, France (ENAC). 
3. Fifty students from Technische Universitat Berlin, Germany 
(TU Berlin). 
4. Twenty-two students from the University of Hull, United 
Kingdom (Hull). 
5. Twenty-four students from Cranfield Institute of Technology, 
United Kingdom (Cranfield). 
6. Twenty-five students from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 
Daytona Beach, Florida (E-RAU). 
7. Twelve students from St. Leo's College, Daytona Beach Center 
(St. Leo's). 
Since entire classes were selected for the tests, subjects whose native 
language differed from that of the country where their respective university 
was located were included in the test. These subjects were subsequently 
sorted into a special group, and their data were not used in the analysis. 
Native Language and Field of Study. 
The subjects came from five main groups based upon their native 
language with two subgroups each according to their field of study. 
Subgroups I (Aero) were complemented by students who studied in an 
aviation-related field (i.e., at ENAC, TU Berlin, Cranfield, and E-RAU), while 
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subgroups II (Other) consisted of students studying in a non-aviation oriented 
field, such as economics (TU Berlin), psychology (St. Leo's and Hull), or 
thermal technology and computer science (Don Bosco). The main groups 
were: 
1. The British group consisted of 27 students who studied in England 
and indicated that their native language was English. Nine 
students studying air transport management at Cranfield 
(subgroup I) and 18 students studying psychology at Hull 
(subgroup II) were represented. 
2. The French group was augmented by 37 subjects whose native 
language was French. Nineteen students were studying air 
transportation at ENAC (subgroup I), while 18 students studied 
thermal technology or computer science at Don Bosco (subgroup II). 
3. All 49 students in the German group studied at TU Berlin and 
reported German as their native language. Subgroup I consisted of 
twenty-seven students in aeronautical engineering (Luft- und 
Raumfahrttechnik), while the 22 students in subgroup II studied 
economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre/Wirtschaftsingenieur-
wissenschaften). 
4. In the U.S. group, 37 U.S. students were represented whose native 
language was English. Twenty-five subjects studied in an 
aeronautical field at E-RAU, while the 12 subjects from St. Leo's 
studied psychology. 
5. All students whose native languages were different from those 
spoken at the universities where they studied were assigned to the 
International group. These students studied at a university outside 
the area of their native language (e.g., Africans, Dutch, Germans, or 
French at Cranfield). Twenty-two students were sorted into this 
group. The data from these subjects were not used in the analysis. 
Overall, 150 students complemented the British (27), French (37), 
German (49), and U.S. (37) groups. All further data and analyses are limited 
to the 150 students in those four groups. 
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Age 
The students varied according to age. Of the 150 subjects, 20 (or 13.3%) 
were 30 years of age or older (one in the U.S. group was over 60), while 130 (or 
86.7%) were under 30. Most (10) of the subjects who were 30 years of age or 
older came from the U.S. group, subgroup II. Table 3 shows the variations 
among the groups according to age. 
Table 3 
Age Distribution by Group 
Group Subgroup Number 
under 30 over 30 Total 
British 
French 
German 
U.S. 
Total 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
6 
15 
17 
17 
27 
21 
25 
2 
130 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
10 
20 
9 
18 
19 
18 
27 
22 
25 
12 
150 
Gender 
Overall, 34 female (22.7%) and 116 male (77.3%) subjects from the four 
main groups participated in the study. The gender ratio varied considerably 
according to the field of study and the native language. 
The highest disproportion by gender was noted in the French group, 
where 36 of the 37 subjects were male. The genders were most evenly 
distributed in the British group. Sixteen (or 59.3%) of the subjects in the 
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British group were male, while 11 subjects were female. Table 4 shows the 
distribution of genders by group. 
Table 4 
Gender Distribution by Group 
Group Subgroup 
Male 
Number 
Female Total 
British 
French 
German 
U.S. 
Total 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
8 
8 
18 
18 
25 
15 
23 
1 
116 
1 
10 
1 
0 
2 
7 
2 
11 
34 
9 
18 
19 
18 
27 
22 
25 
12 
150 
As Table 4 shows, strong variations in the gender distribution could be 
observed within all groups according to the field of study. This is a reflection 
of the different preferences in field of study among male and female students. 
The gender ratio among the subjects who studied aeronautics was highly 
skewed towards the male side. Of the 80 subjects in all subgroups I (Aero), 74 
(or 92.5%) were male. Six (or 7.5%) female subjects studied Aeronautics. For 
the 70 subjects studying in a non-aviation related field (subgroups II), the 
genders were more evenly distributed. Forty-two (60%) of the students in 
these groups were male, while 28 (or 40%) were female. 
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Previous Flight Experience 
Subjects were asked about their previous experience as passenger on a 
commercial aircraft/airliner. Overall, 135 subjects, or 90%, had flown before, 
while 15 subjects, or 10% had not done so. 
Of the 15 students that had not flown before, ten (66.7%) did come from 
the French group (from subgroup II). One subject from the German group 
(subgroup I) and three subjects from the British group (subgroup II) had not 
flown before. In the U.S. group, one student from subgroup I had not flown 
on a commercial aircraft before. 
Table 5 
Flight Experience by Group 
Group 
British 
French 
German 
U.S. 
Total 
Subgroup 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
I (Aero) 
II (Other) 
Experience 
9 
15 
19 
8 
26 
22 
24 
12 
135 
Number 
No Experience 
0 
3 
0 
10 
1 
0 
1 
0 
15 
Total 
9 
18 
19 
18 
27 
22 
25 
12 
150 
All 15 subjects without flight experience were male. The 34 female 
students in the four groups all had previously been as a passenger aboard a 
commercial aircraft. 
Instrument 
The reviewed literature did not suggest the existence of standardized 
tests to measure the interpretation and understanding of passenger safety 
briefing cards among subjects with different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, 
the researcher developed and pretested a five-part test/questionnaire for this 
study. Native speakers (graduate students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University including the researcher) reviewed and translated the tests from 
English into French and German. The tests/questionnaires were sent by mail 
to the participating universities and administered there by local contacts. 
Copies of the tests can be found in Appendices D, E, and F. 
Description 
The tests consisted of five parts on seven 8.5in x 11 in U.S. standard 
letter pages: 
1. In the first part, five questions solicited information about the 
subjects' previous air travel experience and their exposure to safety cards. 
Subjects had to indicate whether they had previously flown on a commercial 
aircraft (yes I no). If they had flown before, they were asked to state how often 
they usually flew per year (about once or twice/ several times/about each 
month), when they did fly last, (less than a month ago/less than a year 
ago/more than a year ago), whether they read the safety card on their last 
flight (yes/no), and - if they did not read the card - why (knew its 
contents/did not want to/could not find it). 
2. An opinionnaire solicited the subjects' opinions regarding their 
preferred safety card design to test Hypotheses I and II. Subjects were asked to 
indicate (using the numbers 1, 2, and 3) the three design features which were 
most important to them if they had to design a safety card. The seven items 
they could choose from were: (a) drawings, (b) photographs, (c) durability of 
the card, (d) use of different languages, (e) multi-colored, (f) size of the card, 
and (g) words/writing. 
3. In an additional questionnaire-part, 13 black-and-white pictograms 
of a fixed size (50 mm x 50 mm and 50 mm x 75 mm, respectively) similar to 
those on current safety cards were presented to the test participants. The 
subjects were asked: "For each of the symbols presented, please describe in a 
few words what you think they represent most likely." An example was 
included to show the intention of the question. 
Three of the 13 pictograms focused on floor-level emergency exit 
lighting and color-coding of exits. Three pictograms depicted the requirement 
to take off (high-heel) shoes before using emergency exit slides. Two 
pictograms showed the correct method of using the exit slides, and two 
symbols represented the prohibition of the using electronic equipment aboard 
an aircraft. The other three pictograms pertained each to a special area: 
(a) supplemental oxygen, (b) in case of ditching, and (c) prohibition of butane 
lighters. The intention of this part was to investigate the actual 
understanding and interpretation of current safety card pictograms 
(Hypothesis IV). 
4. The fourth part of the questionnaire/test contained three questions. 
In the first question, the subjects were presented with the situation that they 
had to open an over-wing emergency exit door. The scenario was presented 
in writing and in five line-drawings of the size 63 mm x 63 mm. The subjects 
had to select from four illustrated choices where they would leave the door 
once removed from the frame: (a) on the seats in front of you, (b) throw it 
outside the plane, (c) on the seats in your row, or (d) on the seats in the row 
behind you. This question was included in the test as an additional 
indication of the general hypothesis that cross-cultural differences existed 
among the subjects from the four cultures. 
To test the research hypothesis regarding the color of lights to denote 
emergency exits (Hypothesis III), a two-part question was introduced in the 
test. Since subjects with previous exposure to air travel were thought to 
answer the question depending upon their experiences, the question was 
posed in two ways: 
In the first part (question 5a), the subjects were asked: "Which color 
most likely indicates an exit?" The subjects could choose from five options: 
(a) white, (b) yellow, (c) red, (d) green, and (e) blue. 
In the second part of the question (5b), the subjects were asked: "In 
your opinion, which color should be used to mark an exit?" The subjects 
again could choose from the same five colors: (a) white, (b) yellow, (c) red, 
(d) green, and (e) blue. 
5. Biographical data from the subjects were collected using the 
questionnaire-form in the last part of the test. These data included the 
subjects' gender (female/male), age in broad thirty-year intervals (under 30,30 
to 60, over 60), native language, home country, country where studying, and 
field of study (major). 
Development and Features 
The safety test/questionnaire was developed by the researcher at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. During all phases of the 
development, the researcher solicited input and opinions from various 
faculty, staff, and students at E-RAU. 
In order to develop a data gathering instrument which was valid and 
reliable with respect to the understanding of safety cards, a sample of current 
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passenger safety briefing cards for jet aircraft was collected. Several U.S. and 
international airlines were solicited for safety cards from their fleets. A total 
of 82 cards were collected. Seventy-two cards from 24 operators in 12 
countries pertained to jet aircraft. The safety cards in the sample were pre-
sorted according to their main technique of presenting safety information, 
following the categories proposed by Schmidt and Kysor (1987). The 
researcher evaluated the cards with respect to special safety areas and possible 
ambiguities in their design (see Review of the Related Literature). Selected 
features of the cards were the basis for the development of a special safety 
test/questionnaire. 
Since the reviewed literature suggested a significant influence of 
previous flight experience on safety card understanding, the first section of 
the test centered on this topic. Broad categories were chosen to minimize 
possible confusion and thus unreliable data from the subjects. The goal was 
to differentiate between subjects with casual and those with frequent 
experience, as well as between subjects with recent and those with past 
experience as aircraft passenger. Additionally, data regarding the usage of 
safety cards were collected. 
The subjects did indicate their three preferences of safety card design 
features in an opinionnaire-form question. Seven common design features 
were identified from the sample of safety cards. To allow the subjects to 
"create" their favorite design, the three most important items were solicited. 
In the main part of the test, 13 pictograms similar to those found on 
actual safety cards were presented. In open-ended questions, the subjects 
described in a few words what they thought the respective pictograms 
indicated. For the selection of the 13 pictograms that had to be interpreted, 
four main safety areas were identified: (a) Floor-level emergency exit lighting 
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and color-coding of exits (three pictograms); (b) the requirement to take off 
(high-heel) shoes before using emergency exit slides (three drawings); (c) the 
correct method ("jump - don't sit") of using exit slides (two pictograms); and 
(d) the operation of electronic equipment on board (two symbols). These four 
areas were found to be of special interest, since they either were critical to 
survival after an aircraft accident (e.g., the location and operation of safety 
exits and slides), or - as in the case of the operation of electronic equipment -
were not intuitively obvious without special knowledge. As stipulated in 
U.S. FAR 91.21(a) (see Appendix G), the operation of any portable electronic 
device aboard an air carrier aircraft is prohibited, unless it is allowed through 
the special exceptions in FAR 91.21(b). Thus, the pictures were specifically 
included to test Hypothesis IV, using a regulation the subjects were most 
likely not completely familiar with. 
Within the four main areas, the researcher identified two to three 
pictograms each from the safety card sample. To add some further indication 
about the influence of realism on the general understanding of pictures, the 
pictograms were chosen from the safety card sample by their degree of 
abstraction: For the removal of (high-heel) shoes, for example, the selected 
symbols varied from very naturalistic over somewhat naturalistic to very 
abstract (Figure 1). The same general principle was used to select the 
pictograms for the emergency exit floor lighting system (Figure 2), the exit 
slide usage (Figure 3), and the operation of electronic equipment (Figure 4) 
Three pictograms from other areas were considered by the researcher to 
be probably ambiguous and thus included in the test. Additionally, these 
symbols served the purpose of "hiding" the pictures from the four main areas 
within a larger number of symbols. 
41 
HEELS2 HEELS1 HEELS3 
Very Abstract Naturalistic Very Naturalistic 
Figure 1. The Three Pictograms Representing Instructions to Remove High-
Heel Shoes (HEELS1, HEELS2, HEELS3). 
FLOORLIG SMOKELIG EXITl 
Abstract Naturalistic Very Naturalistic 
Figure 2. The Three Pictograms Representing Information about Floor Exit 
Path Lighting (EXITl, SMOKELIG, FLOORLIG). 
SLIDE1 
Abstract 
SLIDE2 
Very Abstract 
Figure 3. The Two Pictograms Representing Instructions for the Usage of 
Emergency Exit Slides (SLIDE1, SLIDE2). 
ELECTROl 
Abstract 
ELECTR02 
Naturalistic 
Figure 4. The Two Pictograms Representing the Prohibition to Use Certain 
Kinds of Electronic Equipment (ELECTROl, ELECTR02). 
The 13 selected pictograms were similar to those on a total of 31 cards 
in the safety card sample. Thirteen airlines were represented with symbols: 
five from the U.S. (Continental®, Eastern®, Pan American®, United®, and 
U.S. Air®), five from Europe (Euroberlin France®, Hapag-Lloyd®, 
Lufthansa®, LTU®, and Luxair®), and three from Asia (Cathay Pacific®, 
Garuda Indonesia®, and Singapore Airlines®). Appendix H contains the 
pictograms used in the test and information about those cards whose symbols 
they resembled. 
All symbols were redrawn by the researcher in a fixed size. Those 
pictograms which were originally circular or square were drawn in the size 
100 mm x 100 mm for master prints. On the tests, the pictograms were 
reduced to a size of 50 mm x 50 mm. The two originally rectangular 
pictograms were redrawn in a size of 100 mm x 150 mm for the master prints 
and then reduced to 50 mm x 75 mm on the test. While three colors (black, 
blue, red) were used on the larger master prints, only pictograms in 
monochrome black/grey/white appeared on the actual tests. The symbols 
were redrawn to enhance the print-quality of the pictograms on the test and 
to exclude any biases induced by colors or different sizes. 
Since the operation of over-wing exit doors are depicted differently on 
safety cards, one question in the test focused on this topic. The researcher 
prepared a perspective line-drawing of an over-wing exit row as seen from 
the aisle. The master copy was of the size 150 mm x 150 mm, later to be 
reduced to 63 mm x 63 mm for the test. Five copies were produced, in which 
the position of the door was varied. The first drawing showed that the door 
was to be removed. Following the options offered on current safety cards (see 
Review of the Related Literature), the other four pictorial representations 
showed four answer choices of where to put the emergency exit door once 
removed from the frame: (a) on the seats in front of the exit row, (b) outside 
the plane, (c) on the seats in the exit row, or (d) on the seats behind the exit 
row. The pictures were included to avoid misunderstandings among the 
subjects regarding the four options. Additionally, the drawings helped 
subjects without air travel experience to imagine the situation. 
Because subjects with previous exposure to air travel were thought to 
answer a question regarding the color-coding of exits on aircraft depending 
upon their experience, the question was posed in two ways: The first part of 
the question (What color most likely indicates an exit?) was intended to get 
information about the subjects1 knowledge and previous experience and to 
prevent misunderstandings due to possible differences in experience and 
favorization of a certain color. The second part (What color should be used?) 
allowed subjects who had previous exposure to a certain color coding to 
express their agreement or rejection of that particular color, while it also gave 
subjects without previous flight experience the opportunity to indicate their 
preferred color. 
The last part of the instrument collected biographical data from the 
subjects, such as gender, age group, native language, country of origin, 
university, and field of study. These data were intended to allow analysis for 
extraneous variables (within-groups factors such as gender vs. the between-
groups factor, culture). 
Test Instructions 
The tests were given at different universities in several countries. To 
exclude biases due to changes in administration of the tests, special 
standardized test instructions were developed. The instructions focused on 
administration as well as timing of the test and return of the survey forms to 
the researcher. Detailed instructions were given. 
The sentences to be read to the students were included in the test 
instructions, so all subjects would receive the same directions. The 
instructions also contained detailed information about the timing of the test 
and the return of the survey forms to the researcher. The aim was to provide 
the local test administrators with the simplest and least time-consuming 
procedures. 
The instructions which were originally developed in English were 
translated by native speakers into German and French. Sample copies of the 
test instructions can be found in Appendix I. 
Design 
The design approach of this study was a combination of both 
descriptive techniques for data collection and causal-comparative methods for 
data analysis. The study investigated differences among current university 
students from different cultural backgrounds with regard to their 
understanding and interpretation of aircraft passenger safety briefing cards. 
To obtain the data, a combined questionnaire/opinionnaire was 
administered at seven universities in five countries. The institutions were 
selected from those to whom the researcher or faculty and students at Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University had contacts. The group included not only 
technical universities but also universities without a concentration in 
engineering or aviation. The narrowing of schools to those described did 
ensure local support for the project, timely answers, a 100-percent response 
rate, and thus more reliable data. 
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To assure confidentiality of the tests, the survey was designed in a way 
which did not allow the identification of particular respondents from the 
answer sheets without an in-depth knowledge of the respective university 
group. The only demographic data collected were gender, age group in broad 
thirty-year intervals, country of origin, major field of study, and personal air 
travel experience in broad intervals. 
The causal-comparative method for data analysis was appropriate since 
the study attempted to determine the cause for probable differences in the 
understanding and interpretation of aircraft passenger safety briefing cards. In 
a 4 x ( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ) factorial arrangement, the subjects varied post-facto between 
groups according to their culture (British, French, German, U.S.), as well as 
within groups according to their field of study (Aero, Other), previous flight 
experience (Yes, No), gender (Male, Female), and age (under 30, 30 and above). 
The study attempted to determine whether the between-groups factor had a 
significant influence on the subjects' answers when compared to the within-
groups factors. 
No variables among the subjects were manipulated by the researcher. 
The test design was kept constant among all tests. All groups were 
predetermined, according to the subjects' culture and field of study. Thus, the 
experimental method was not indicated (Gay, 1987). 
Limitations 
The design of the study attempted to control for as many extraneous 
variables as possible. Standardized test instructions were used to keep the 
procedure as constant as possible. The questions were in the same order in all 
tests to exclude differences due to a change in the order of questions. Native 
speakers translated and checked the tests and the test instructions to exclude 
any limitations that the usage of one language would have implied. Where 
possible, pictorial representations complemented the test questions. The 
subjects were exclusively university students, to restrict biases induced by 
differences in educational level. Subgroups were formed to control for 
variances in aviation knowledge. 
There were, however, variables which the design of the study could 
not control: 
1. Although the local research assistants were provided with detailed 
test instructions, the physical layout of the test environment as well as the 
actual procedure used during the tests were beyond the control of the study. 
2. The subjects were asked to give professional answers. Since no 
direct incentive was offered to the students for completion of the test, the 
motivation of the students towards the test was beyond the control of the 
study. 
3. The test was conveying information in writing and in pictures. The 
pictures were of constant quality and location on all tests. Although native 
speakers were used to translate the tests, subtle differences introduced during 
the translations from English into French and German, however, might not 
have been detected during the design. As shown earlier, verbal cross-cultural 
communication is subject to possible misunderstandings. These subtle, but 
perhaps significant differences were beyond the control of the study. 
4. The limitation of the study to university students from four 
relatively similar Western cultures might have introduced a bias towards less 
distinct cultural differences. If, however, culture is to be determined as a 
significant factor among the subjects from an otherwise somewhat 
homogeneous group such as university students from Western democracies, 
it can be assumed that these findings can be generalized towards much more 
heterogeneous groups, such as nations in Europe and Africa or Asia. 
5. Due to the selection of entire classes for the test, age, gender , and 
previous flight experience could not be controlled. These factors must be 
considered as extraneous variables during the data analysis. 
Procedure 
Pilot Tests 
To determine validity and reliability of the instrument, the test/ 
questionnaire and the instructions were pre-tested during all stages of their 
development. During the initial phases, a prototype test was administered 
and discussed in a graduate level class on "Research Methods and Statistics" 
(MAS 605) at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Findings from this 
pilot-test were incorporated in the design of the instrument. The final draft 
of the test/questionnaire was then pilot-tested in two classes at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University: a Master's level class on "Human Factors in 
Aviation" (MAS 604) and an undergraduate class "Introduction to 
Psychology" (SS 220). After the review of the pilot-study, one question of the 
test and one part of the instructions pertaining to the time necessary for 
completion were changed slightly to exclude ambiguities which became 
apparent during the pilot test. 
In the initial design of the questionnaire/test, subjects displayed 
problems regarding the question asking them "You are now studying in . . ." 
Instead of answering with the country, as intended by the test design, the 
students did answer this question with the name of their university. The 
question was therefore amended with the printed statement "(country)" to 
better reflect the intention. 
The time for completion of the questionnaire had been estimated to be 
30 to 45 minutes before the pilot tests. It became apparent during the pilot 
study, however, that the tests could be completed by all subjects within 10 to 
15 minutes. Therefore, the time stated in the instructions for completion of 
the test was changed to 15 minutes. 
Administration of the Tests 
The test was administered at seven universities in five countries. The 
questionnaires and test instructions in the respective language were sent to 
the universities together with a self-addressed envelope and a cover letter 
explaining the purpose of the study. Contacts at the universities were 
professors, teachers, and assistants to whom the researcher or faculty and 
students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University had previous associations. 
The local test administrators selected an entire class from the specified field of 
study (aerospace or non-aerospace). Following the test instructions, the local 
contacts administered the test to the students in the respective classes in one 
session of approximately 20 to 25 minutes duration, including distribution 
and collection of the forms. 
During the test, the subjects were informed about the purpose of the 
study and asked for their participation. They were advised not to sign their 
name anywhere on the test to guarantee anonymity. The subjects were 
informed that they had 15 minutes to complete the test, and that they would 
be reminded after 10 minutes that 5 minutes were left for completion of the 
test. The subjects were asked to answer the questions in the language of the 
country they studied in (i.e., English in the U.K. and the U.S., French in 
Belgium and France, and German in Germany). 
After ten minutes, the test administrators informed the subjects that 
five minutes were left to complete the test. The students were also asked to 
make pure that they completed the questions soliciting biographical 
information. 
At the end of the 15 minutes, the test administrators asked the 
participants to stop answering and to make sure that the biographical 
questions were answered. If the subjects had not completed this part, they 
were asked to do so at that time. 
The answer sheets were collected by the test administrators and sent by 
mail in the self-addressed envelopes back to the researcher at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University. All tests were received completely and within the 
time specified in the test instructions, except those from one university. 
Since the number of responses from ENAC was not sufficient after the first 
test, the test was again administered to other students to reach the targeted 
total number of about 20 students. The answers from the additional test were 
received in a separate envelope. 
After the completed questionnaires/tests had been received by the 
researcher at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, the results were 
translated by native speakers where needed, categorized, and compiled into a 
database that allowed statistical analyses. The collected data were used to 
reject or accept the four null hypotheses derived from the previously stated 
research hypotheses. 
Analysis 
General Approach 
Two types of data were collected during the study. Most data were 
nonparametric (ordinal). Other data, such as the design-preferences for safety 
cards, were transformed into parametric weighted scores (interval data). Since 
the two types of data existed, both the statistical methods for nonparametric data 
(Chi-Square) as well as the Analysis-of-Variance method for parametric (interval) 
data were employed. Throughout the analysis, it was attempted to avoid 
introducing Type I errors into the study, i.e., declaring that a significant 
difference due to culture existed, when, in fact, there was no difference. It was 
felt by the researcher that this procedure would give more weight to those areas 
where differences could be observed. Therefore, a conservative approach was 
selected in determining whether significant differences existed between the 
cultures. 
One of the areas of concern during the analysis was the composition of the 
tested groups. The subjects who participated in the test varied between the main 
groups (British, French, German, U.S.) by their culture, i.e., native language. 
Within the cultures, the subjects varied according to their field of study 
(Aeronautics, Other), previous flight experience as passenger (yes, no), gender 
(female, male), and age (under 30, 30 or older). This represented a4x (2x2x2x2) 
factorial arrangement. 
The design of the study did not control for a balanced or representative 
factorial arrangement of subjects among the groups. With the relatively small 
number of subjects participating, some factorial groups were not represented at 
all, or only with few subjects. In the French group, for example, only one female 
subject was represented. This did not allow any statistical analysis by gender 
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paired with native language when the French group was included. Other groups 
were strongly biased with respect to age. Most (ten) of the 20 subjects who were 
30 years of age or older came from the U.S. group, while only one subject from 
the German group was 30 or older. Therefore, a full multiple analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) combining the five factors language, field of study, previous flight 
experience, gender, and age was not indicated. Instead, a three-fold approach 
was selected to test for the variances according to culture. 
All Subjects 
In the first test, all subjects from the four main groups (British, French, 
German, U.S.) were included. When indicated by the type of data, a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the respective test answers as 
the variable and native language as the factor. When ordinal data were 
analyzed, a Chi-Square test was used. Since these tests included all subjects, they 
also incorporated all possible biases due to the skewness of the test groups. 
Therefore, if culture (i.e., native language) was found to have a significant (i.e., 
p<0.05) effect, it had to be tested whether this influence was caused by the 
varying compositions of the groups with respect to age, gender, or field of study, 
rather than by culture. 
Highly Stratified Subgroup 
It was possible that the one-way ANOVA or Chi-Square test incorporating 
all subjects was inconclusive regarding a significant influence of culture. 
Therefore, second one-way ANOVAs or Chi-Square tests were performed for all 
hypotheses, using a highly stratified subgroup. A sufficient number of otherwise 
uniform subjects was found among three main groups (French, German, U.S.) 
which were to be analyzed for the research hypotheses. All students in this 
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highly stratified group studied aeronautics, had previous flight experience as 
passengers, were male, and under 30 years of age. From the French group, 16 
students fulfilled these parameters. Twenty-four German students and 22 U.S. 
students were represented in the highly stratified group. The five subjects from the 
British group who fell into the category were not considered, if necessary for 
analysis, due to the insufficient number of subjects from that subgroup. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for the 
influence of culture (i.e., native language) among the subjects from the highly 
stratified group for parametric data. For ordinal data, a Chi-Square test was 
employed. If culture had a significant (p<0.05) effect on the test answers among 
all subjects and among the highly stratified group, it was assumed that these results 
could be generalized towards the respective populations. Conversely, if no 
significant effect of culture was found for both groups (all, highly stratified), it was 
assumed that there was no significant difference between the subjects in the 
study due to their culture. 
The highly stratified group included those subjects who studied aeronautics 
and thus had considerable knowledge regarding aviation-related topics. 
Therefore, it was not assumed that a lack of a significant difference by culture 
within the highly stratified group necessarily meant that there was absolutely no 
difference between subjects from different cultures. In contrast, the highly 
stratified group was only used to confirm observed differences among all subjects. 
In those cases where the highly stratified group would not confirm the influence of 
culture found for all subjects, further tests were conducted. 
Control Tests 
1. Where the ANOVAs/Chi-Square tests for all subjects and for the highly 
stratified group indicated a significant effect of culture, Tukey HSD pairwise 
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comparisons or additional two-way Chi-Square tests were used to determine 
which cultures differed significantly. Additionally, the direction of differences 
according to culture was investigated. 
2. To reach conclusive results in those cases where the results varied 
considerably between all subjects and the highly stratified group (i.e., not significant 
for one, but significant for the other group), the test answers were analyzed for 
other variables, such as age, gender, previous flight experience, and field of study. For 
each of the parametric factors, a Chi-Square test was performed to determine 
whether the extraneous variables had a significant influence on the test results. If 
one factor could be determined as significant (p<0.05), the subjects were 
reordered according to this factor. Within the new stratified subgroups, a one-
way ANOVA or Chi-Square test by language was performed to determine 
whether culture had a significant influence on the test results besides the 
previously identified extraneous variable. If no other factor was determined as 
significant, pairwise t-tests/Chi-Square tests between the suspected groups were 
performed. If the t-test/Chi-Square test was significant, it was concluded that 
culture did have a significant influence on the subjects' answers. 
3. No further tests were conducted if both the ANOVAs/Chi-Square tests 
for all subjects and for the highly stratified group did not indicate a significant 
influence of culture on the subjects' answers. It was concluded that in those 
cases, culture did not have a significant influence on the subjects' answers. 
Safety Card Design Features 
Description 
In question 2 of the questionnaire/test, the subjects were asked to indicate 
the three features they would put the most emphasis on if they had to design a 
passenger safety card. The subjects indicated their design preferences with the 
numbers 1,2, and 3, where 1 indicated the most important item. Tables 6,7, and 
8 show the distribution of the design features by native language. 
Table 6 
First Design Choices in Percents by Country 
Colors 
Drawings 
Durability 
Language 
Photos 
Size 
Words 
Total 
N 
British 
0.00 
66.67 
3.70 
11.11 
14.81 
0.00 
3.70 
100.00 
27 
French 
0.00 
67.57 
2.70 
27.03 
0.00 
0.00 
2.70 
100.00 
37 
German 
2.04 
67.35 
0.00 
20.41 
4.08 
0.00 
4.08 
100.00 
49 
US 
0.00 
43.24 
5.41 
5.41 
32.43 
2.70 
10.81 
100.00 
37 
Total 
0.67 
61.33 
2.67 
16.67 
12.00 
0.67 
5.33 
100.00 
150 
N 
1 
92 
4 
25 
18 
1 
8 
Table 6 indicates that 61.3% of the subjects selected drawings/pictograms 
as their first choice. It is notable that, although a relative majority of 43.2% of the 
U.S. subjects also selected drawings as their first choice, this proportion was 
considerably lower than for the British (66.7%), French (67.6%), or German 
(67.4%) groups. Photos, however, were selected by 32.4% of the U.S. subjects. 
And while photos were chosen by 14.8% of the British subjects, no French 
student and only 4% of the German students decided in favor of photos for their 
first design choice. 
Any form of written instructions was chosen by 22% of all subjects as a 
first choice: 16.67% selected multiple languages, while 5.33% of all subjects 
favored words/writing. About 27% of the French, 20% of the German, 11% of 
the British subjects, and 5% of the U.S. subjects chose multiple languages. Words 
were selected by 4% of the German students, 10.8% of the U.S. subjects, 
the French, and 3.7% of the British subjects. 
Table 7 
Second Design Choices in Percents by Country 
Colors 
Drawings 
Durability 
Language 
Photos 
Size 
Words 
Total 
N 
British 
11.11 
7.41 
7.41 
25.93 
11.11 
0.00 
37.04 
100.00 
27 
French 
21.62 
24.32 
5.41 
24.32 
16.22 
2.70 
5.41 
100.00 
37 
German 
14.29 
10.20 
2.04 
55.10 
4.08 
8.16 
6.12 
100.00 
49 
US 
13.51 
27.03 
0.00 
16.22 
8.11 
10.81 
24.32 
100.00 
37 
Total 
15.33 
17.33 
3.33 
32.67 
9.33 
6.00 
16.00 
100.00 
150 
Table 8 
Third Design Choices in Percents by Country 
Colors 
Drawings 
Durability 
Language 
Photos 
Size 
Words 
Total 
N 
British 
14.81 
0.00 
14.81 
25.93 
0.00 
14.81 
29.63 
100.00 
27 
French 
8.11 
5.41 
18.92 
21.62 
16.22 
5.41 
24.32 
100.00 
37 
German 
28.57 
14.29 
6.12 
8.16 
0.00 
20.41 
22.45 
100.00 
49 
US 
13.51 
2.70 
2.70 
24.32 
10.81 
16.22 
29.73 
100.00 
37 
Total 
17.33 
6.67 
10.00 
18.67 
6.67 
14.67 
26.00 
100.00 
150 
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As indicated in Tables 7 and 8, worded instructions (i.e., words or 
multiple languages) became more emphasized as second and third design 
choices, whereas pictorial representations such as drawings and photos were 
primarily selected as the first design choice. This indicates that graphics were 
widely accepted by the subjects in the test as a primary means of conveying 
safety-related information. Approximately one-third of the subjects indicated 
that they liked colored representations. Color, however, was mostly selected as a 
second or third choice. 
Drawings as a Design Feature 
The reviewed literature indicated an emphasis on non-verbal 
communication in the high-context French culture and a French preference for 
graphic stimuli. In the low-context German culture, however, a high demand for 
detailed, preferably printed information was suggested. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that French subjects would choose graphic representations (i.e., 
drawings) more often than German subjects when being asked about their design 
preferences on aircraft passenger briefing cards (Hypothesis la). 
In order to consider the fact that the subjects could indicate their three 
design preferences, two tests were conducted. In the first test (non-weighted), the 
mentioning of a design choice by a subject (regardless of whether as first, second, 
or third choice) awarded that design feature one point each. The scores were 
used as ordinal data. Figure 5 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who 
chose drawings as a design feature. 
% of Subjects % of Subjects % of Subjects 
o 
o o ON O 
00 
o 
o o o ON O 00 o 
o o o ON O 00 o 
o o 
• 
n 
n 
B 00 00 oo 
59 
were awarded. For selection as a second choice, this feature received six points, 
and three points for being chosen as a third choice. No points were awarded if 
the feature was not mentioned at all by the subject. Using the weighted scores as 
interval data, the maximum mean score was 9.0, if all subjects in a group selected 
a feature as their first choice, while the minimum mean score was 0.0 if the 
feature was not mentioned at all. 
Using the weighted scores as ordinal data, a Chi-Square test was conducted. 
Although significant differences due to culture among all subjects could be 
observed (X2=26.882, d/=9, p=0.002), no significant differences between the 
German and the French group were found: X2=5.252, d/=3, p=0.154. 
Since the weighted scores were primarily intended as interval data, a one-
way analysis of variance using the weighted scores was conducted. Culture was 
found to have a major effect at the p-0.037 level (F=2.909) for all subjects. Further 
analysis using a Tukey HSD comparison revealed a significant (p=0.026) 
difference between the U.S. (M=5.595, 3.752) and the French (M=7.703, SD=2.184) 
groups. However, no significant differences between the German group 
(M=7.102, 3.043) and the other groups were found. An ANOVA for the highly 
stratified group did confirm the absence of a significant difference between the 
German and French groups. For the highly stratified group, no significant 
differences between any cultures were found (F (3, 63)=2.164, p=0.101). 
Significant differences in employing drawings as a design preference for 
aircraft passenger safety briefing cards were observed between the French and 
the U.S. groups for all students. Considering the weighted and non-weighted scores, 
no significant differences, however, were found between the German and the 
French group regarding the employment of drawings on passenger safety 
briefing cards. Hypothesis I stated an assumed significant difference between 
the French and German groups and a specific direction of hypothesized 
difference which was not observed. Therefore, Hypothesis la was rejected. 
Worded Instructions as a Design Preference 
To test Hypothesis lb, which stated that German subjects would select 
written instructions significantly more often than French subjects, the same 
principle of weighted and non-weighted scores as for drawings was used. Since the 
test question offered two features in the list which employed words (multiple 
languages and words/writing), a combined weighted and a combined non-
weighted score for worded instructions was determined: For each of the two 
features, the normal weighted and non-weighted scores were calculated. The 
respective scores from the features were then added to a combined weighted or 
non-weighted score. Since each feature could only be mentioned once, the 
maximum possible mean score would have been M=15 (=9+6) for the combined 
weighted score, if all subjects selected one feature as their first choice, and the 
other feature as their second choice, respectively. The minimum possible mean 
score would have been 0, if none of the subjects mentioned any of the two 
features. Figure 6 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who chose 
worded instructions as a design feature for aircraft passenger safety cards. 
The Chi-Square test for the non-weighted scores found no significant 
differences due to culture for all subjects: X2=2.1258, d/=2, p=0.3455. In a 
control-test, no significant differences were observed between the German and 
the French groups: X2=2.037, rf/=2, p=0.3612. 
Conducting the respective ANOVAs for all subjects and the highly stratified 
group, no significant differences were observed between any of the groups. For 
the combined weighted score, the values were F (3,146)=1.131, p=0.339 for all 
subjects, and F(3, 63)=1.111, p=0.352 for the highly stratified group. 
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Photos as a Feature in the Design of Safety Cards 
The data regarding the design preferences for aircraft passenger safety 
briefing cards were also analyzed regarding the preference for photos as a design 
feature. Photos were used relatively widely on U.S. safety cards but on only very 
few European cards. Additionally, it was hypothesized that photos would 
appeal to the realistic U.S. communication style suggested by the literature. 
Thus, Hypothesis II stated that U.S. subjects would indicate a higher preference 
for photos as a design feature on safety cards than European subjects. 
Using the same design approach as for Hypothesis I, one-way ANOVAs 
were performed for all subjects and the highly stratified group with the weighted 
scores as the variables (interval data). The analyses revealed significant 
differences in the design preferences between the U.S. and the German groups 
and between the U.S. and the French groups for the weighted scores. U.S. subjects 
did choose photos significantly more often than German or French subjects. For 
the weighted scores and all subjects, the values were: F(3,146)=7.747, p<0.0005, 
with Tukey HSD pairwise probabilities of p=0.007 between the French and U.S. 
groups and p<0.0005 between the German and the U.S. groups. No significant 
differences were found between the German and the French groups, the U.S. and 
the British, or the British and the French and German groups. These results were 
confirmed by the ANOVA for the highly stratified group: F(3, 63)=4.530, p=0.006. 
Figure 7 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who chose photos as a 
design feature for all subjects. 
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British French German U.S. 
Figure 7. Photos as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Design Choices for all Subjects. Percentage 
of Subjects by Culture. 
For the non-weighted scores, significant differences could be observed 
between the U.S. and the German groups. With X2=19.990, df=3, p=0.0002 for all 
subjects, and a pairwise X2=20.070, df=l, p<0.0005, U.S. subjects chose photos 
more often than those from Germany. Since only four German subjects selected 
photos, one cell of the matrix was sparse. A Fisher exact test supported p<0.0005 
between the German and the U.S. groups. The fact that the French group did not 
significantly differ from the U.S. group for the non-weighted scores (X2=2.720, 
df=l, p=0.0991; Fisher exact test: p=0.1570) was attributed to the significant 
number of French subjects who mentioned photos as a second and third design 
choice. 
There was no general significant difference between European and U.S. 
subjects regarding a preference for photos on safety cards. However, significant 
differences could be observed between the German and the U.S. groups and 
(when only considering the weighted scores) between the U.S. and the French 
groups. Therefore, the original Hypothesis II had to be rejected, since the 
differences were not uniform between the European and the U.S. groups. 
Color-Coding of Exit Lights 
Subjects were asked to indicate which color they thought indicated an exit 
in aircraft floor lighting (current method). The subjects also indicated which color 
- in their opinion - should be used for this purpose (preferred option). Since exit 
signs in buildings are red in the U.S., while they are green in wide parts of 
Europe, it was hypothesized that U.S. subjects would choose red over other 
colors, whereas Europeans would prefer green to other colors (Hypothesis III). 
Highly significant differences regarding the observations and preferences 
for exit light color coding were found between the subjects from the U.S. and 
those from Europe. Chi-Square tests for both the current method and the preferred 
option showed significant differences when incorporating all color choices: For 
the current method and all subjects, culture had a significant influence at p<0.00005 
(X2=46.219, d/=12). This finding was supported by the Chi-Square test for the 
current method and the highly stratified group: X2=40.3647, d/=12, p=0.0001. Highly 
significant differences were also found for the preferred option at X2=42.4203, 
rf/=15, p=0.0002 for all subjects, and X2=38.4950, d/=15, p=0.0008 for the highly 
stratified group. The higher number of degrees of freedom for the preferred 
option resulted from two subjects who did not answer the question. 
Further investigation of the test answered showed that subjects from the 
U.S. significantly more often chose red, while the European subjects preferred 
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green. Figures 8 shows the percentages of subjects by culture according to the 
color they selected as the current method for all subjects. The almost even 
distribution of the German subjects between red and green can possibly be 
explained by previous experiences, in which the subjects observed red as a color 
on aircraft from U.S. airlines. The subjects studied in Berlin. Until the end of the 
special air traffic rules in 1990, U.S. air carriers transported a high proportion of 
the passengers to and from Berlin. 
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Figure 9. Color Coding of Exit in Floor Lighting. Comparison of Red and Green 
as the Current Method for all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture. 
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Figure 10. Color Coding of Exit in Floor Lighting. Indicated Preferred Option for 
all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture. 
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As shown in Figure 10, the variations between the European groups 
became smaller regarding the preferred option: 66.7% of the British, 59.5% of the 
French, and 61.2% of the German subjects chose green as their preference. Only 
13.5% of the U.S. subjects selected green. For red, the ratios reversed: 78.4% of 
the U.S. subjects chose red, while 22.2% of the British, 27.0% of the French, and 
26.5% of the Germans among all subjects selected red. The same general ratios 
could be observed among the highly stratified group. Figure 11 compares the 
selection of RED and GREEN for the preferred option for all subjects. 
The Chi-Square tests indicated highly significant differences between the 
U.S. and the European subjects regarding the selection of colors for floor lighting 
to code emergency exits. These differences were in the expected direction. 
Therefore, Hypothesis III was accepted. 
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Figure 11. Color Coding of Exits in Floor Lighting. Comparison of Red and 
Green as the Preferred Option for all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture. 
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Interpretation of Pictograms 
In the test, 13 pictograms similar to those on current aircraft passenger 
safety briefing cards were presented. The subjects were asked to describe in a 
few words what they thought the symbols represented most likely. An example 
was given to illustrate the type of requested answer. The pictogram given as an 
example showed a cigar and a pipe within a typical prohibition sign (Figure 12). 
The example of the type of requested answer was therefore: "Do not smoke cigars 
or pipes" It was hypothesized that, due to the differing communication styles 
identified in the literature, the interpretation of pictograms would vary by 
culture (Hypothsis IV). 
Figure 12. Example Given in the Test: "Do Not Smoke Cigars or Pipes " 
Approach 
The subjects answered these open-ended questions with interpretations in 
their own words. No immediate values such as in multiple-choice tests could be 
assigned to their answers. To assess the understanding and interpretation of the 
symbols by the subjects and to allow statistical analyses, the students' answers 
were graded by the researcher. Three scoring levels were used: 
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1. An answer was considered to be correct and complete when all main 
safety information contained in the pictogram was stated by the subjects. The 
complete and correct answer for the given example contained three basic parts. 
The symbol showed (a) a cigar, (b) a pipe, and (c) the prohibition. Thus, any 
answer mentioning all three parts would have been graded as correct and complete 
and been awarded the value +1.0. 
2. An incomplete but safe answer was one where the probable outcome of 
the subject's understanding and interpretation of the pictogram as indicated by 
the answer would most likely not have adversely affected the subject's safety or 
compliance with the underlying safety regulation. If, for example, a subject 
answered "Do not smoke" or "Smoking prohibited" when interpreting the symbol 
given as an example, this would not have adversely affected the subject's 
compliance with the stated rule "Do not smoke cigars or pipes" The answer, 
however, would also not have been correct and complete, since smoking of 
cigarettes, for example, was not prohibited by the sign. An incomplete but safe 
answer was scored as neutral and awarded the value 0.0. 
3. If an answer was wrong or unsafe, the incorrect interpretation of the 
symbol was either contrary to the intention of the pictogram, or it possibly 
endangered the safety of the subject in an applicable situation. An example of a 
wrong or unsafe answer for the pictogram "Do not smoke cigars or pipes" would, for 
example, have been: "Smoking allowed" or "Cigars and pipes allowed." Since the 
reviewed literature (e.g., Johnson, 1984; Barthelmess, 1985) indicated that 
passenger inaction after aircraft accidents contributed significantly to the 
occurrence of fatalities and injuries, it was also considered to be wrong or unsafe, if 
no answer was given. Answers of this type were graded with a -1.0. 
For each symbol, the different components of the pictogram were 
reviewed, and the respective answers were graded according to the standardized 
requirements. The scores for each pictogram were analyzed using the 
aforementioned three-step process. The scores were used as ordinal data, since 
no degree of unsafety or safety could be determined. 
Categorizations 
All symbols were reviewed regarding contents and intention. For each 
pictogram, the components of a complete and correct answer were defined. 
Acceptable incomplete but safe answers were specified. The subjects' answers 
were then graded according to the categories. 
Pictogram 1 (EXITl). This symbol showed the location of an overwing 
emergency exit, as indicated by the different colored lights in the emergency 
lighted floor path (Figure 13). For their answer to be scored as correct and 
complete, the subjects had to mention both that an exit was located between the 
seat rows as well as the indication via the floor path. "Follow floor lights to exit" or 
"Emergency exit lighting" were examples of acceptable complete and correct answers. 
Figure 13. Pictogram 1 (EXITl). Follow Floor Lights To Exit. 
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An answer which only mentioned the exit (e.g., "Exit located between seat 
rows" or "Exit this way") but not the floor path was considered to be incomplete but 
safe. The subjects would probably have found the exit in an emergency. 
Examples of wrong or unsafe answers given by subjects for this pictogram 
were: "Follow arrow on floor to emergency exit" (there is no arrow on the floor in the 
airplane), or "In an emergency, the seat row must be pushed to the forward marker to 
use the emergency exit." 
Pictogram 2 (SLIDE1). This pictogram indicated the correct and incorrect 
ways of using an emergency exit slide (Figure 14). "Jump - do not sit" was one of 
the most frequent complete and correct answers for this pictogram. Since the 
important feature was the correct method (jump), an answer such as "Jump when 
using exit slide" was also classified as complete and correct, although "do not sit" was 
not mentioned. 
Figure 14. Pictogram 2 (SLIDE1). Jump - do not sit. 
Incomplete but safe answers did not mention the correct method (jump), but 
noted the incorrect method (e.g., "Do not sit down", "Do not wait on top when using 
exit slide"). Other answers from this category were "Accelerate before using slide" or 
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"Use emergency slide quickly." Since it was not clear from the answers whether th( 
subjects would actually jump, but perhaps sit down briefly before sliding down 
the chute, these answers could not be categorized as complete and correct. 
Some subjects gave wrong or unsafe answers such as "Do not jump onto the 
emergency exit slide" or "Sit down before using exit slide." These answers 
contradicted the intention of the symbol. 
Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). This symbol was one of three showing the 
instructions to remove high-heel shoes before using an emergency exit slide 
(Figure 15). A complete and correct answer mentioned the instruction to remove 
high-heel shoes, such as "Remove high-heel shoes," "Take off high heeled shoes," or 
"Take of stilettos" (a term most often used by subjects from Hull). 
Figure 15. Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). Remove High-Heel Shoes. 
An incomplete but safe answer was "Remove shoes" Although the instruction 
to remove all shoes is preferred by some airlines (e.g., Lufthansa, LTU, Hapag-
Lloyd), problems can emanate when delays occur, or when survivors have to 
pass debris inside and outside the plane without shoes. Since the intent of the 
instruction to remove high-heel shoes for the use of the emergency slide would 
73 
have been fulfilled by removing all shoes, however, these answers were 
considered to be incomplete but safe. 
Most wrong or unsafe answers reversed the intention of the pictogram and 
interpreted the symbol as a prohibition to take off shoes (e.g., "Do not take off 
shoes" or "Prohibited to take off shoes"). 
Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). The depiction of a mask with the printed symbol 
O2 as an indication of the location and operation of an oxygen mask was 
completely recognized by most subjects. Mentioning an oxygen mask was 
considered a complete and correct answer (Figure 16). 
Figure 16. Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). Oxygen Mask. 
It was not completely clear whether the subjects who answered "Poisenous 
fumes present" or "Gas mask" realized the intention of the oxygen mask. Since they 
most likely would have used the mask, these answers were categorized as 
incomplete but safe. 
The only two examples of wrong or unsafe answers for this pictogram were 
"Danger of open fire" and "Tube supplies H2O." In all other cases when the 
categorization was wrong or unsafe, it was due to the fact that no answer was 
given. 
Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). This symbol was one of two prohibiting the 
operation of certain electronic equipment aboard an aircraft. A cellular phone 
and a radio were depicted within the general symbol for prohibition (Figure 17). 
The correct and complete interpretation of the symbol in accordance with 
applicable regulations would have been "Certain electronic equipment shall not be 
used aboard the aircraft." The criterion for the classification of an answer as correct 
and complete was, therefore, the mentioning of electronic items (such as radios or 
telephones) and of the fact that these items should not be used. Examples of 
complete and correct answers were "Do not use transistors or portable phones" or "Do 
not use equipment that may interfere with frequency." 
Figure 17. Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). Do Not Use Certain Electronic Equipment. 
Since the regulations only prohibit the operation of electronic equipment, 
but do allow the carriage of these items aboard a plane, any answer that did not 
mention the usage was not considered complete and correct. Thus, answers such 
as "No radios or telephones" or "Radio devices prohibited" were considered to be 
incomplete but safe. 
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Wrong or unsafe answers did not assure that the equipment was not used 
(if not even carried). An example was "Radio reception technically impossible" 
which would probably have a reader try the operation of such equipment 
regardless of the statement. 
Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). Although the picture was more abstract (Figure 
18), the intention of this symbol was equal to that of Pictogram 3 (HEELSl). 
Thus, the same criteria were used. 
Figure 18. Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). Remove High-Heel Shoes. 
Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). This symbol had two components: A floor 
guidance system (heavy dashed line) and the instruction to stay close to the 
ground/crawl under smoke in case of a fire (Figure 19). A complete and correct 
answer for this symbol mentioned both parts of the instructions (e.g., "In case of 
smoke, follow the emergency exit markings on the floor"). 
Incomplete but safe answers mostly did not mention the exit path marking 
on the floor but recognized the need to stay below the smoke in case of fire and 
to crawl towards an emergency exit. Since these answers indicated the correct 
interpretation of the immediate danger of smoke inhalation, which would result 
in more time to search for an exit, they were categorized as incomplete but safe. 
76 
Figure 19. Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). Crawl under Smoke and Follow Floor 
Markings. 
Examples of wrong or unsafe answers were "Lie down on the floor" 
(potentially dangerous) and "Life vests are located under the seats" The latter 
interpretation was mentioned several times by subjects from different groups. 
Pictogram 8 (SLIDE2). The intention of this symbol (Figure 20) was equal 
to that of Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). Therefore, the same categorizations were used. 
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Pictogram 9 (DITCH). The depiction of a stylized airplane on water was 
used on several cards as an indication of "In case of an emergency landing on water, 
... [to be followed by instructionsf (Figure 21). The categorization used for this 
symbol was very strict: Only answers mentioning the intention of the pictogram 
as an introduction to other instructions were graded as complete and correct. 
Thus, answers which merely mentioned "Airplane on water" or "Ditching" 
were only scored as incomplete but safe. Several wrong or unsafe interpretations 
were noted, such as "Plane will float" (possibly dangerous), "Seaplane" (a common 
answer), or "Seaplane landing area." 
J 1 
Figure 21. Pictogram 9 (DITCH). In Case of an Emergency Landing on Water,... [to 
be followed by instructions]. 
Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). This symbol (Figure 22) had the same intention 
as pictograms 3 and 6. Thus, the same classifications were used in the grading of 
the answers. During the categorizations, it was noted that many subjects whose 
answers were classified as wrong or unsafe indicated confusion as to whether the 
symbol meant to remove or wear shoes. 
78 
Figure 22. Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). Remove High-Heel Shoes. 
Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). Similar to Pictogram 1 and 7, this symbol 
presented the emergency exit floor lighting (Figure 23). A complete and correct 
answer mentioned both the exit as well as the indication through the lighted 
path. 
%^m 
Figure 23. Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). Colored Lights in the Floor Indicate an 
Emergency Exit. 
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Incomplete but safe answers recognized that the picture pertained to an exit, 
but failed to mention that lights indicated the location. Although it is unclear 
whether the subjects realized that the exit was marked by lights, they probably 
would have remembered the very generic depiction of lamps in the picture when 
looking for the exit. 
Many wrong or unsafe answers stated that the exit location was actually 
noted by a sign with the printed word "Exit." An example was "Exit is marked by 
sign." 
Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Having the same intention as pictogram 5, 
this symbol depicted a radio crossed out by two diagonal bars (Figure 24). 
Again, mentioning the fact that operation of such equipment (e.g., "Radios," 
"Transistors") was prohibited was necessary for the categorization as complete and 
correct. Since the applicable rule was assumed not to be known widely among 
the subjects, the mentioning of one type of equipment was sufficient, although 
the regulations state that the operation of all electronic equipment is prohibited 
unless specifically allowed. 
Figure 24. Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Do Not Use Certain Electronic Equipment. 
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Incomplete but safe answers did not mention the operation, but the carriage 
of the specified equipment. Examples were "Do not carry radios," "Transistors 
prohibited," or "No radios." 
Wrong or unsafe answers mistook the symbol for a prohibition of noise, bul 
did not limit the operation of the equipment. An example was "No loud music" 
Pictogram 13 (BUTANE). The depiction of a crossed-out gas lighter was 
found on the cards of one U.S. airline (U.S. Air®), together with the printed 
explanation "No butane lighters". Only answers that mentioned "No gas lighter" or 
"No butane lighter" were considered to be complete and correct, since the intention 
of the symbol was to ban the operation of pressurized lighters due to the 
possibility of high flames and explosions at reduced cabin air pressure during 
flight. 
Matches, other lighters, or open flames were not prohibited by the sign. 
Since answers such as "No lighters," "No open/naked flames," or "No matches or 
lighters" assured that butane lighters also would not been used, these answers 
were categorized as incomplete but safe. 
Figure 25. Pictogram 13 (BUTANE). Do Not Use Butane/Gas Lighters. 
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Most entries in the category wrong or unsafe were due to a lack of an 
answer. One answer, however, in this category was "Flammable." This answer 
did not assure that gas lighters would not been used, since the subject would 
perhaps make a mental connection between the pictogram and some part of 
equipment on the plane. 
Results 
Performing Chi-Square tests by language between all subjects, culture was 
determined to be of significant influence (p<0.05) for five of the 13 pictograms: 
(a) Pictogram 1 (EXITl), (b) pictogram 2 (SLIDEl), (c) pictogram 5 (ELECTROl), 
(d) pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG), and (e) pictogram 11 (ELECTR02). For the eight 
other pictograms, no significant influence of culture on the interpretation and 
understanding of the symbols was found among all subjects . Figure 26 shows the 
p-values for the influence of culture found during the analysis for all subjects. 
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Figure 26. Cultural Differences in Interpreting Safety Card Pictograms. p-Values 
of Significance for all Subjects Using Chi-Square Tests. 
The results of the Chi-Square tests by culture for the subjects in the highly 
stratified group (as defined earlier) confirmed a significant influence of culture on 
the interpretation of the symbols for four of the aforementioned five pictograms: 
Pictogram 1 (EXITl), pictogram 2 (SLIDEl), pictogram 5 (ELECTROl), and 
pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). 
For pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG), the Chi-Square test among the highly 
stratified group did indicate a significant influence of culture at p=0.063, slightly 
above the required level of p<0.05. Further analysis revealed that the significant 
influence was found for all subjects between the British and the German groups 
and between the British and the U.S. groups. The British group, however, was 
not represented in the highly stratified group. Thus, the results from this group 
could not show any differences between the respective groups. Appendix J 
contains the test results in interpreting pictograms by culture for all subjects. 
Pictogram 1 (EXITl). Significant differences due to culture were found 
among all subjects with X2=28.92, p<0.0005, df=6 (Figure 27). The French subjects 
did give considerably more wrong or unsafe answers than all other subjects: 38% 
of the French answers were categorized as wrong or unsafe. However, only 2% of 
the German, 8% of the U.S., and 11% of the British answers were identified as 
wrong or unsafe. Most French wrong or unsafe answers indicated that the arrow 
(fliche) used in the symbol was actually installed in the aisle. Another wrong 
answer from the French group that was mentioned several times was "Ejection 
seat." Significant differences were found at p=0.0221 between the British and the 
French, at p=0.0001 between the French and the German, and at p=0.0098 
between the French and the U.S. groups. Furthermore, significant differences 
were observed between the British and the German groups at p=0.0394. 
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Figure 27. Interpretation of Pictogram 1 (EXITl) for all Subjects. Percentage of 
Subjects by Culture. 
The Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group confirmed the 
significant differences between the French and the other groups at X2=27.19, 
p<0.0005, d/=6. It was concluded that culture had a significant effect on the 
interpretation of pictogram 1. 
Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). Significant differences due to culture were found 
among all subjects in the interpretation of pictogram 2 (Figure 28). The Chi-
Square test for all subjects showed a significant difference at X2=15.71, p=0.015, 
df=6 between the German and the French groups (pairwise probability p=0.0132), 
as well as between the German and the British groups (pairwise probability 
p=0.0219). No significant differences were observed between the British and the 
French groups, or between the U.S. and any other groups. 
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British French German U.S. 
Figure 28. Interpretation of Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl) for all Subjects. Percentage of 
Subjects by Culture. 
For the highly stratified group, the Chi-Square test confirmed significant 
differences at p=0.0001 (X2=13.204, d/=6). Further evaluation of the test scores 
revealed that the significant differences in the interpretation of pictogram 2 due 
to culture resulted from the comparatively high number of German answers that 
were classified as incomplete but safe. In this category, 24.49% of German answers 
were found, in contrast to only 3.7% of the French, 5.41% of the British, and 
10.81% of the U.S. answers. Many German subjects did not include the correct 
method (jump) in their answers but used general statements which did not clarify 
whether they would jump down the emergency slide. Examples of such answers 
were"Use slide as quickly as possible," "Do not hesitate on top of the slide," or "Don't 
stay seated on slide." 
The analysis of the data suggested significant differences due to culture 
between the German and the British and French subjects. It was concluded that 
culture had a significant main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 2. 
Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). The analysis of the answers for pictogram 3 did 
not suggest any significant influence of culture on the subjects' answers for any 
group (X2=9.928, df=6, p=0.128). The percentages of subjects answering with a 
correct and complete answer did vary between 70% and 89%, however not 
significantly. Subjects from all cultures did recognize and describe the symbol at 
a high level of correctness. It was concluded that culture had no significant main 
effect on the interpretation of pictogram 3. 
Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). Many subjects in the pre-study pilot test had 
indicated that they considered the symbol for supplemental oxygen to be a 
particularly bad pictorial representation. However, this symbol received one of 
the highest overall rate of recognition of all pictograms in the test. More than 
90% of subjects from all cultures described the symbol with a complete and correct 
answer, and only six of the 150 subjects did give a wrong or unsafe answer. No 
significant differences across cultures were observed in the analysis with 
(X2=0.544, rf/=6, p=0.997) for all subjects. Thus, it was concluded that culture had 
no significant influence on the understanding and interpretation of pictogram 4. 
Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). For the symbol prohibiting the use of 
electronic equipment aboard an aircraft, significant main effects of culture on the 
answers were found. The Chi-Square test and the subsequent pairwise 
comparisons for all subjects showed at X2=25.603, d/=6, p<0.0005 cultural 
differences between the U.S. and the French groups (p=0.0003), and between the 
U.S. and the German groups (p<0.0001). No significant differences were found 
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between the U.S. and the British groups (p=0.3001) or between the German and 
the French (p=0.6779) groups. Significant differences were again found when 
comapring the British and German (p=0.0212) groups, as well as the British and 
the French groups (p=0.0154). The observed differences were confirmed for the 
highly stratified group at X2=l 1.226, rf/=4, p=0.0241, with significant differences 
between the German and the U.S., and the French and U.S. groups. 
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Figure 29. Interpretation of Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl) for all Subjects. Percentage 
of Subjects by Culture. 
The test results were reviewed more closely to determine the reason for 
the significant differences in the mean scores of the U.S. and French, and U.S. and 
German subjects (Figure 29). More than three-quarters of the U.S. answers 
(75.68%) and almost two-thirds of the British answers were categorized as 
incomplete but safe. However, only 30.61% of the answers from the German and 
32.43% from the French group were listed in this category. The reason for this 
difference was found to be the preference of U.S. (and British) subjects for the 
short answer "No radios or telephones." While this answer was safe, it was 
ambiguous as to whether the subjects did correctly interpreted that only the use 
of electronic equipment was prohibited, whereas the carriage of such items was 
allowed. Fewer subjects from the U.S. (and British) groups than from the French 
and German groups used a version of the complete and correct answer "Do not use 
radios or telephones." A possible explanation for this difference could be the brief 
and to-the-point communication style in the English language and the U.S. 
preference for short, headline-type statements. These characteristics were 
suggested by the reviewed literature. From the results, it was concluded that 
culture did significantly influence the interpretation of pictogram 5. 
Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). This symbol was the second of three pictorial 
representations of instructions to remove high-heel shoes before using 
emergency exit slides. More than 70% of all subjects gave a complete and correct 
answer: 75.68% of the French, 75.51% of the German, and 75.68% of the U.S. 
answers were complete and correct. Only 59.26% of the British subjects gave 
answers in this category. The reversed situation was true for the wrong or unsafe 
answers: More British (18.52%) answers than French (2.70%), German (2.04%), or 
U.S. (5.41%>) answers were found. However, the Chi-Square test for all subjects 
did not indicate a difference beyond the required level of significance of p<0.05. 
The results were X2=9.980, df=6, p=0.125. 
Further study of the test answers of the British subjects indicated that the 
wrong or unsafe answers in that group resulted from several "Don't know" entries. 
One subject answered "Do not obstruct aisle with loose shoes - not clear at all." Since 
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the statistical analysis did not reveal any significant differences, it was concluded 
that culture had no main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 6. 
Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). The Chi-Square test for all subjects indicated 
significant differences due to culture at X2=l8.978, df-6, p=0.004. Pairwise Chi-
Square tests revealed significant differences between the British and the German 
(p=0.0303) and between the British and the U.S. groups (p=0.0225). The reason 
was the variation of entries in the different categories: No British answer, but 
16.22% of the French, 20.41% of the German, and 8.11% of the U.S. answers were 
categorized as wrong or unclear, mostly because no answer was given (Figure#30). 
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Figure 30. Interpretation of Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG) for all Subjects. Percentage 
of Subjects by Culture. 
The reverse ratios were found for the correct and complete answers: Here, 
21.62% of the U.S., 35.14% of the French, 48.98% of the German, and 51.85% of 
the British subjects indicated both the danger from smoke and the emergency exit 
path lighting. Most answers from U.S. subjects (70.27%) lacked the information 
about the floor marking, and thus were categorized as incomplete but safe. 
Review of the scores for the highly stratified group did not confirm the 
results for all subjects, since the British group was not represented. British 
subjects gave relatively more positive answers than subjects from other cultures, 
especially from the U.S. The statistical analysis found significant effects of 
culture on the interpretation of pictogram 7. 
Pictogram 8 (SLIDE 2). The intention of this symbol was equal to that of 
pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). However, in contrast to the analysis for pictogram 2, no 
significant differences (p=0.125) due to culture were found for this symbol. For 
all subjects, the German answers did considerably more often (79.59% vs. 69.39%) 
mention the correct method of using an exit slide (jump). Furthermore, the 
percentages of complete and correct French (70.27% vs. 94.59%) and British (92.59% 
vs. 96.30%) answers reduced, alleviating the differences observed between the 
cultures for SLIDEl to p=0.125 for SLIDE2. These results were confirmed by the 
Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group (p=0.0627). It was, therefore, 
concluded, that culture had no main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 8. 
Pictogram 9 (DITCH). This symbol was similar to one found during the 
review of current safety cards on several German and one U.S. card. Its complete 
and correct meaning was "In case of ditching... [to be followed by instructions]." As 
indicated before, the subjects were graded very strictly. For all subjects, this 
symbol was incorrectly interpreted by almost half of the subjects (46%). Only 
54% of all subjects gave an incomplete but safe (41.33%) or complete and correct 
answer (12.67%). Sixty-nine subjects, however, gave a wrong or unsafe answer. 
Most wrong or unsafe answers interpreted the pictogram as a seaplane (wrong), or 
as an indication that the plane will float (unsafe). 
No significant influence of culture could be observed for all subjects: 
X2=5.996, rf/=6, p=0.4236. These results were confirmed with X2=0.9484, d/=4, 
p=0.9175 for the highly stratified group. It was concluded that culture had no 
significant main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 9. 
Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). The third symbol depicting the instruction to 
remove high-heel shoes showed the lowest overall level of recognition of those 
three pictograms. The Chi-Square test for all subjects revealed no significant 
differences by culture at X2=l 0.3645, df=6, p=0.1101. Pairwise comparisons, 
however, indicated a significant difference between the German and the U.S. 
groups at p=0.0168. Further analysis of the answers showed that almost 50% of 
the German subjects gave a complete and correct answer, whereas the percentage 
of complete and correct answers for the U.S. group was 21.62%. The reversal was 
found for wrong or unsafe answers: Only 10.20% of the German answers, but 
27.03% of the U.S. answers were in this category. Most wrong or unsafe U.S. 
answers were due to the absence of any answer. Common, however, among the 
28 subjects from all cultures who gave such answers was confusion as to whether 
the symbol meant to remove or wear shoes. 
The Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group, however, showed 
significant differences at X2=12.7228, df=4, p=0.0127 due to culture. The same 
difference between the U.S. and the German groups as for all subjects could be 
observed. While 36% of the U.S. subjects in the highly stratified group gave a 
complete and correct answer, 54% of the German subjects did so. In contrast, 32% 
of the U.S. subjects gave a wrong or unsafe answer, while only 8% of the German 
subjects gave such an answer. Although significant differences between the 
German and the U.S. groups could be observed, these differences were not large 
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enough to influence the Chi-Square test for all subjects. It was, therefore, 
concluded that culture had no significant main effect on the interpretation of 
pictogram 10. 
Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). While two-thirds (66%) of all subjects gave a 
complete and correct answer, 22.67% responded with an incomplete but safe 
interpretation; and 11.33% of all subjects gave a wrong or unsafe answer. With 
X2=8.4509, rf/=6, p=0.207, the Chi-Square test for all subjects did not indicate 
significant differences due to culture for pictogram 11. Additionally, no 
significant differences were found among paired groups or within the highly 
stratified group. 
Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Significant main effects for the influence of 
culture on the interpretation of pictogram 12 were suggested by the Chi-Square 
test for all subjects with X2=19.606, rf/=6, p=0.0033. Pairwise comparisons showed 
a significant difference between the German and the U.S. groups at p=0.0003, 
between the French and the U.S. at p-0.0413, and between the British and the 
U.S. groups at p=0.0197. No other significant differences were observed. Figure 
31 shows the percentages for all subjects. 
The significant difference due to culture between the U.S. and the German 
groups were confirmed by the Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group at 
X2=11.300, rf/=4, p=0.0234. No significant differences between any of the other 
groups were found. 
Further analysis of the results supported the findings for pictogram 5 
(ELECTROl). Again, U.S. subjects did considerably more often (94.59%) give an 
incomplete but safe answer such as "No radios" than the German subjects (55.10%). 
Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of German subjects (40.82%) 
indicated the complete and correct answer "Do not use radios" than subjects from the 
U.S. group (5.41%). The results were consistent with the results for pictogram 5. 
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It was concluded that culture had a significant main effect on the interpretation 
of pictogram 12. 
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p=0.3171). Thus, it was concluded that culture had no significant effect on the 
interpretation of pictogram 13. 
Other Influences on the Interpretation of Safety Cards 
In separate Chi-Square tests, the subjects' interpretations of the symbols 
were investigated for significant main effects due to age, gender, field of study, 
or flight experience. The Chi-Square tests were conducted to determine whether 
the differences observed for the different cultures were related to the other 
factors. 
Age. For 11 of the 13 pictograms, age had no significant main effect. The 
Chi-Square test showed a significant influence, however, for pictogram 4 
(OXYGEN) and pictogram 8 (SLIDE2). With X2=7.8915, df=2, p=0.0193, age was a 
main factor in the answers for pictogram 4. The 120 students under 30 gave with 
95.3% more complete and correct answers than the 30 subjects 30 years of age or 
older (80%). With X2=9.0733, df=2, p=0.0107, age also had a significant influence 
on the interpretation of pictogram 8. The group under 30 overall gave better 
answers than the older subjects. Since no significant differences between the 
cultures were found for the two pictograms, it was concluded that the influence 
of age did not interfere with those findings. 
Gender. No significant influence of gender was found for any of the 
symbols in the test except for pictogram 6 (HEELS2). With X2=15.551, d/=2, 
p=0.0004, the 34 female subjects gave significantly less correct and complete 
answers than the 116 male test participants. A review of the test scores showed 
that the difference was due to the fact that women considerably less often 
specified that only high-heel shoes were to be removed. Instead, female subjects 
answered with a general "No shoes." A possible explanation for this result could 
be that the shoe depicted in pictogram 6 was not close enough to a realistic 
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representation of a high-heel shoe to be interpreted as such. HEELS2, however, 
was not found to be significantly influenced by culture. Thus, further analyses 
rearding this pictogram were not performed. 
Field of Study. Of the 34 female subjects in the study, 28 studied in a field 
other than aeronautics. Therefore, the aeronautics group and the other group were 
strongly biased by gender. Since a highly significant difference was found 
between the genders in the interpretation of pictogram 6 (HEELS3), this 
difference was reflected in the significant influence between the aeronautics and 
the other group (X2=11.159, df=2, p=0.0038). The field of study had no significant 
main effect on the interpretation of any other symbol. 
Flight Experience. For two symbols, pictogram 8 (SLIDE2) and pictogram 
9 (DITCH), previous flight experience had a significant main effect. Experience 
was found to influence the interpretations for SLIDE2 at X2=9.078, rf/=2, p=0.0107. 
While 81% of the subjects with experience gave a complete and correct answer, 
only 60% of the subjects without experience did so. However, it must be noted 
that only 15 of the 150 subjects in the test had no previous flight experience as 
passenger. With X2=8.1346, df=2, p=0.0171, experience also had an influence on 
the interpretation of pictogram 9 (DITCH). Again, the 15 subjects without flight 
experience gave significantly fewer correct answers than the 135 subjects with 
previous experience as an aircraft passenger. Subjects without experience mostly 
mistook the symbol for the depiction of a floatplane or as the capability of the 
aircraft to float. No significant influence of flight experience on the cultural 
comparisons were noted. 
Summary 
Significant main effects of culture on the interpretation and understanding 
of pictograms similar to those used on current safety cards were observed. For 
95 
five of the 13 presented symbol, culture had a significant influence between 
different groups at varying degrees. Hypothesis IV stated that the number of 
correct answers would vary between subjects according to their culture. Since 
significant variations were found for at least five of the 13 pictograms, 
Hypothesis IV was accepted. 
Brief Comparison of the Overall Effectiveness of the Pictograms 
Although not integral part of the cross-cultural study, the overall 
effectiveness of the symbols among all subjects was assessed. To give a brief 
comparison, mean scores were calculated. Although the raw scores were ordinal, 
it was assumed that an overall level of understanding could be represented by 
using mean scores (Figure 31). If all subjects had chosen a complete and correct 
answer, the mean score would be M=+1 .0. Converseley, it would be M=-1.0, if all 
subjects in a group gave wrong or unsafe answers. For instructions which were 
represented by more than one symbol, brief comparisons were made. 
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Figure 32. Interpretation of Pictograms. Overall Mean Scores for all Subjects. 
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Exit Lighting 
Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG) depicted the 
lighted emergency exit floor path. Figure 33 shows the differences in the means 
for the three pictograms for all subjects and by culture. 
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High Heel Shoes 
Three pictograms (HEELSl, HEELS2, and HEELS3) displayed the 
instructions to remove high-heel shoes. Figure 34 shows the comparisons of 
mean scores by culture for the three symbols. 
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shoes (wrong or unsafe). One reason could be the absence of an arrow (or a 
similar symbol) in HEELS3 which would have indicated the required direction of 
movement (i.e., to remove shoes). 
Exit Slides 
The correct and fastest way of using exit slides during an emergency 
evacuation was depicted in two pictograms. Both symbols (SLIDEl and SLIDE2) 
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Electronic Equipment 
Figure 36 shows the different mean scores for the pictograms depicting the 
prohibition to use electronic equipment (ELECTROl, ELECTR02). Both 
pictograms were effective in that almost no wrong or unsafe answers were given, 
even if many subjects (especially from the U.S.) limited themselves towards 
answers such as "No radios." These answers suggested that the subjects thought 
that not only the use, but also the carriage of such equipment was not allowed. 
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Conclusions 
The results of this study indicate that culture can have a significant 
main effect on the understanding and interpretation of safety information by 
passengers from different countries. A self-developed aviation safety 
test/questionnaire which focused on information found on aircraft passenger 
safety briefing cards was administered to students from three cultures in 
Western Europe and from the U.S. Significant culture-related differences at 
p<0.05 were found. 
The research hypotheses with respect to the understanding of the color 
coding used for exits in aircraft floor lighting was accepted. Significant 
differences were also found regarding the interpretation of symbols similar to 
those used on current aircraft passenger safety information cards. It was 
concluded that culture significantly influenced the subjects' answers in these 
areas. 
Some of the hypothesized differences, however, were not observed. 
No general trend following the communication styles suggested by the 
literature could be identified in the design preferences for aircraft passenger 
safety cards. Still, significant variations were found among the cultures. 
These differences were between other groups than hypothesized. 
In all but two cases, the significant differences existed between the U.S. 
group on one side, and the French and/or German groups on the other side. 
Additionally, all observed differences were at least between one of the two 
English-speaking groups (i.e., British or U.S.), and one of the groups from 
Continental Europe (i.e., French, German). This led to the conclusion that 
native language as one part of culture had a significant main effect. The 
British and U.S. groups only varied where a convention regarding the color 
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used for exit floor lighting was involved. In all other cases, there was no 
significant difference between the two groups. It was concluded that the 
British and the U.S. groups not only used the same language, but also shared 
other characteristics in communication style (e.g., a higher preference for 
photos as compared to the French and German groups). 
In two cases, significant differences were found between the French and 
the German groups. No clear pattern could be observed. German answers 
were very detailed and longer than those from all other groups. This, 
however, did not induce significant differences in the correctness of the 
answers. It was concluded that the assumed strong differences in 
communication styles between the French and the German groups did not 
became apparent in the study, if they existed. 
Interpretation of Pictograms 
For five of the 13 pictograms presented to the subjects, significant 
differences in understanding and interpretation due to culture were found. 
The observed differences were mostly caused by a significantly higher number 
of incomplete or incorrect answers from the subjects in one group as 
compared to the other three groups. For three of the five pictograms, the U.S. 
group had significantly lower scores, resulting from very short answers or the 
absence of any answer. 
One interpretation of these findings can be the short and to-the-point 
communication style of the English language. Short sentences and headline-
type statements are preferred in the U.S. Thus, when interpreting the 
pictograms HEELS3, ELECTROl, and ELECTR02, short answers such as "No 
radios" or "No shoes" were preferred by U.S. (and to a certain extent, British) 
subjects. These answers were scored as incomplete but safe, since they did not 
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clarify what was exactly meant by the symbols, without giving a wrong or 
unsafe answer. Potential problems, however, could emerge for the 
instructions to remove high-heel shoes, where differences between the U.S. 
and the German group were observed. If all passengers take off their shoes 
during an emergency, possible dangers are delays, obstruction of the aisles and 
seat-rows with loose shoes, and the lack of protection of the passengers' feet 
against debris. These hazards might outweight the advantages induced by the 
removal of high-heel shoes for the usage of the exit slide. It was concluded 
that the short U.S. interpretations could potentially have an impact on safety. 
The same problem of answers that lacked precision was found for 
SLIDEl. German answers were in exhaustive detail regarding the need to use 
the slide as quickly as possible, but failed to mention the best way to do so 
(jump). Here, the long and complicated German style which resulted in high 
mean scores for other pictograms became counterproductive. Interestingly 
enough, German subjects mentioned jumping considerably more often for 
SLIDE2. 
The interpretation of EXITl was the only case where a significant 
difference was found due to a high number of wrong or unsafe answers from 
one group. Many French subjects implied in their answers that the arrow 
used in the picture was actually installed in the aircraft. This was incorrect. 
The reason why many subjects in the French group gave this interpretation 
remained unclear. 
For several safety-related areas, such as the usage of exit slides or 
removal of high-heel shoes, more than one pictogram was presented. It 
became apparent from the test scores that most pictograms were correctly 
interpreted by a large percentage of subjects. Some symbols, however, were 
recognized and understood better than others. One of the symbols for the 
removal of high-heel shoes, for example, led to confusion among many 
passengers as to whether the symbol meant to take off or put on shoes. For 
the symbols prohibiting the use of certain electronic equipment, the subjects' 
answers showed a high proportion of literal interpretations: Only the 
depicted equipment was mentioned. It was concluded that the degree of 
subjects1 understanding varied according to the quality of the symbol. 
Safety Card Design Preferences 
The results regarding design preferences for safety cards did not show 
the hypothesized differences between the German and the French groups 
based on varying communication styles. German and French subjects chose 
drawings and words at almost equal numbers. This indicated that the 
preferences among French and Germans suggested by the literature for 
advertisements were not significant for the preferred design of safety cards. 
Drawings were a feature mentioned almost equally often by subjects 
from all cultures. It was concluded that drawings are a method of conveying 
safety information accepted by all cultures in the test. 
U.S. subjects selected photos more often and with a higher priority 
than European subjects. These differences, however, were significant 
between the German and the U.S. group. It was concluded that photos were a 
design feature appealing to U.S. subjects, while unimportant to Germans. 
Color Coding of Exits in Floor Lighting 
As was hypothesized, European subjects indicated significantly more 
often than U.S. subjects that green was used as the color to denote an 
emergency exit in aircraft floor lighting. Conversely, red was mentioned by 
U.S. subjects significantly more often than by European subjects. The same 
significant differences were found when the subjects were asked which color 
should be preferred to indicate exits: U.S. subjects chose red, while European 
subjects selected green. Only very few subjects from any culture mentioned 
any color other than green or red. These findings corrobated with the current 
color coding of exit signs in buildings. In the U.S., exit signs are red, while 
green is used in wide parts of Europe. It was concluded that the answers 
varied significantly due to the subjects' previous experiences. 
The results of this part of the study are in agreement with general 
principles of cross-cultural communication suggested by the reviewed 
literature. Bertin (1983) stated that "the meaning of a symbol becomes 
familiar to us only by habit; through the repetition of a similar situation" 
(p. 95). In a specialized field such as the use of colors to denote exits, the 
employed code must be learned to correctly interpret the symbol. If the code 
varies from one culture to another, it must be expected that the interpretation 
of the respective symbol differs according to culture. 
The findings from the test suggest that a European passenger who is 
caught in an aircraft accident might search for green lights in the floor path. 
Based upon previous experience, the passenger might believe that green 
indicates the exit, even when - on a U.S. plane - the exits are marked in red. 
The passenger would probably not be able to identify the location of exits and 
thus might perish in the wreckage. The reverse situation would be true of a 
U.S. passenger aboard a plane that has an emergency floor path installed 
which uses green as the color to denote an exit. It was therefore concluded 
that the current status of employing varying colors in different countries to 
denote emergency exits could result in potentially dangerous confusion 
among the passengers as to how an exit is actually marked. 
Summary 
Significant differences due to culture could be observed between the 
subjects for several of the investigated areas. This finding is important since 
it gives empirical evidence to the hypothesis that the understanding of safety-
related information can vary with culture. Once these differences are 
investigated and documented, it will be possible to begin research into the 
development of a safety information format that is equally effective for 
subjects from different cultures. 
Throughout the study, all possible precautions were taken to avoid 
Type I errors, i.e., the statement that a significant difference due to culture 
existed, when, in fact, there was none. It was felt by the researcher that this 
procedure would add weight to the findings in those areas where significant 
differences were observed. A very strict method for the analysis of data was 
used. Direct pairwise Chi-Square tests would have probably shown significant 
differences between more groups and for more questions. A highly stratified 
control group was used to confirm the results found for all subjects. Thus, 
the researcher took the risk to commit Type II errors, i.e., to state that there 
was no significant difference when there was one. Still, significant culture-
induced differences were observed. 
Furthermore, the differences were found between subjects from four 
cultural areas which share a long history and many common concepts. All 
subjects came from highly industrialized Western Democracies. All subjects 
were university students. Yet, even between those subjects of the same age, 
gender, and experience that studied in the same, test-related field, significant 
differences were observed. 
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Aircraft passenger safety briefing cards are an important part of safety 
precautions in aviation. Previous experience has shown that the cards help 
to save lives during aircraft accidents. Thus, they must be understood by all 
readers, regardless of age, gender, previous experience, or culture. The results 
of this study led to the conclusion that cultural differences must be taken into 
account when designing aircraft passenger safety information. 
Recommendations 
General Recommendations 
The test showed significant differences due to culture in the 
understanding and interpretation of certain passenger safety information. 
These differences were found between subjects from Western Europe and the 
U.S., relatively similar societies. It can only be assumed to what extent the 
differences would grow in scale and severeness, if subjects from more distinct 
cultures were selected. Therefore, one recommendation is to test safety cards 
internationally among subjects from different cultural areas. 
Recommendation I 
Test at least those safety briefing cards used on international flights for 
their effectiveness among subjects from different cultures to determine 
whether the cards are significantly less effective for particular cultures than 
for others. Preferably, test in many different countries, but use at least subjects 
from the countries of departure and arrival. 
Recommendation II 
As one step towards more international testing, replicate this study 
with subjects from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to determine whether 
greater differences exist between cultures that do not share the same 
geographical or historical background. Target populations could include 
China, Japan, Argentina, or Kenya. 
Since the differences between the cultures were observed using the 
conceptual test method, it can only be assumed whether the subjects would 
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act differently in an emergency according to their answers. Cross-cultural 
differences might even be more pronounced when the subjects have to 
perform the necessary tasks. 
Recommendation HI 
In follow-up tests, use the behavioral test method to investigate the 
influence of cross-cultural differences on the understanding and 
interpretation of passenger safety information. Employ the conceptual test 
method to identify symbols that have different meanings to subjects from 
different cultures. Then, using these symbols, test whether the differences 
found in the conceptual tests have a significant influence on subjects' 
behavior. 
Recommendations for Test Procedures 
During the analysis of the data, several shortcomings of the study due 
to the selection of subjects became apparent. A broad approach was used to 
test for as many different areas of interpretation of safety information as 
possible. The subjects in the test varied according to four extraneous variables 
which were unevenly distributed across the cultures. As a result, a highly 
stratified group had to be used as a control group, introducing the chances of 
committing Type II errors into the study. Therefore, the following measures 
are recommended for follow-up studies. 
Recommendation IV 
Use test groups that are either representative of the respective 
population, or limit the number of extraneous variables as much as possible. 
The second option, however, increases the chances for Type II errors. 
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Recommendation V 
When using the same approach of using entire classes from 
universities for the test, amend the test instructions so that only native 
students should complete the test. All non-native subjects were removed 
from the analysis which reduced the number of subjects in one group 
(British, subgroup I, Cranfield) considerably. 
Recommendation VI 
This study used a broad approach, testing in several areas of 
interpretation and understanding of safety cards. For follow-up studies, test 
only one area (e.g., high-heel shoes) at one time, but in more detail. 
Recommendations for Safety Card Design 
According to the results of the extended tests, an international standard 
for safety cards should be developed. Instructions that are effective for one 
culture might be ineffective in another culture. Standardized instructions at 
an optimum overall level could aid towards familiarity with the procedures 
among all readers. They could also help people from different cultures in 
understanding the information without the need for translation, alleviating 
problems of confusion due to changing instructions. 
Standardization also has the advantage of lower cost. An effective 
safety card would be developed once, and only the details regarding a 
particular airplane would change. This would save cost, and allow air carriers 
from less wealthy countries to acquire effective safety briefing cards. 
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Recommendation VII 
If indicated by the extended cross-cultural tests, develop an 
international standard regarding safety cards. The standard should include 
guidelines regarding the size, format, color, etc. of the cards. Furthermore, 
details with respect to the way safety information is depicted should be given. 
Some of the design feature questions indicated that drawings were 
acceptable to and desired by most subjects in the test. In previous studies (e.g., 
Johnson, 1980), drawings were found to be more effective than photos, since 
they reduced visual clutter and allowed emphasis of certain, important parts 
of the picture. Some of the pictograms were recognized and interpreted more 
correctly by all subjects than others. 
Recommendation VIII 
As a first step towards standardization, make the use of drawings to 
convey safety information mandatory. Then, select those symbols and 
pictograms that showed a high level of recognition among subjects from all 
cultures and standardize them. 
Recommendations Regarding Specific Pictograms 
The symbols used to convey the instruction to remove high heel shoes 
were recognized at varying degrees. HEELS3 was particularly confusing to 
some subjects who did not know whether the symbol meant to remove or to 
wear shoes. 
I l l 
Recommendation IX 
Amend the symbol HEELS3 with an arrow showing the direction of 
movement away from the foot. 
The subjects' interpretation of the symbols showing the prohibition to 
use electronic equipment aboard the airplane was very literal. The subjects 
mentioned only the type of equipment actually depicted on the cards. 
Recommendation X 
Amend the pictograms depicting the prohibition to operate certain 
electronic equipment as to which equipment shall not be used. Consider 
removal of the symbol from the safety card, since this instruction is not 
directly related to the safety procedures for the case of an aircraft accident. 
Consider combining this information with others such as no smoking on a 
separate instruction sheet which the passengers could receive with their ticket 
or boarding pass. 
Recommendations Regarding Exit Path Lighting 
Several of the questions in this study were connected to emergency exit 
floor path lighting. Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG) 
showed different depictions of the guidance system. Two questions centered 
around the color-coding of exits in the floor lighting. 
The findings of this study with respect to the color-coding of exits are 
important to aircraft passenger safety. The location of emergency exits is a 
critical step in survival after aircraft accidents. Previous aircraft accidents 
showed that people died because they were not able to find the exit in a 
smoke-filled cabin. Two passengers were killed in 1983 during the post-
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accident fire of a twin-jet at the Greater Cincinnati International Airport 
because they could not locate the overwing emergency exit (NTSB, 1986). The 
survivors of this accident indicated that they had severe difficulties to find 
the exit. This airplane had no emergency floor lighting, and the only hints 
that the survivors used to locate the exit were a dim glow of light or a draft of 
air. As a result of this accident, the emergency floor path marking was 
introduced in the U.S. 
In 1991, the researcher had the opportunity to participate in evacuation 
trials from the cabin safety simulator at the Civil Aeromedical Institute 
(CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Even without any heat or toxic fumes 
present from a fire, with the emergency floor path installed, and with the 
researcher being informed about the path, it was difficult to locate the exit in a 
cabin filled with non-toxic smoke. If the confusion in a real emergency 
evacuation, the heat, smoke, and toxic fumes from a real fire are added to the 
situation, the location of the exit could become a very demanding task for the 
average passenger, even without the added confusion as to whether the exit 
floor path is colored red or green. 
It has been suggested by the literature that there are symbols that are 
more universally accepted than others, either because they are intuitively 
obvious to the observer, or because a certain familiarity has been built across 
cultures (Bertin, 1983). One example is the use of colors in traffic signals. 
Across the world, red means "Stop" in traffic lights, while green means "Go." 
It can be assumed that the majority of aircraft passengers is exposed to this 
color code on a daily basis. As has been stated earlier, humans tend to revert 
to old habits and learned behavior when confronted with a high-stress 
situation. Thus, passengers who did not previously learn which color was 
used to mark an exit would probably transfer their experiences from surface 
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travel to aviation. They would think that a green light indicated a clear path 
to proceed across the lights and towards the exit. Conversely, confronted with 
red lights, they might conclude that they should not cross the signal because 
greater danger was behind it. 
The respective U.S. regulation for floor proximity emergency escape 
path marking can be found in FAR 25.812 (e) (DoT, 1992). While the colors 
for emergency exit signs are stipulated as red letters on white surface, no 
specifications as to color are made for the identification of the exits in the 
floor path. Therefore, any color could be chosen without changing the 
regulations. Since the researcher believes that it would add to safety to 
standardize the exit coding, preferably to the more intuitive green, the 
following recommendations were made. 
Recommendation XI 
As long as there is no standard as to which color is used, emphasize the 
color used in a particular aircraft in all passenger information. Amend safety 
briefing cards, crewmember briefings, and videotape instructions, if necessary, 
to point out which color denotes an exit. 
Recommendation XII 
Develop an international standard for the use of colors in denoting 
exits. Test green for its effectiveness; if effective with respect to legibility, 
contrast, acceptance, etc., implement green in all aircraft. 
Recommendation XIII 
Color coding would not be necessary if the path itself showed the exits 
by turning towards it, similar to the arrow presumed to be installed by some 
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subjects in the French group. Install a guidance path which leads directly to 
the exit, and color coding is no longer important. 
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APPENDIX A 
FAR PART 121.571 AND FAR PART 121.585 (d) AND (e) 
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§121.571 Briefing passengers before take off. 
(a) Each certificate holder operating 
a passenger-carrying airplane shall 
insure that all passengers are orally 
briefed by the appropriate crewmem-
ber as follows: 
(1) Before each takeoff, on each of 
the following: 
(i) Smoking. Each passenger shall be 
briefed on when, where, and under 
what conditions smoking is prohibited 
(including, but not limited to, the per-
tinent requirements of Part 252 of this 
title). This briefing shall include a 
statement that the Federal Aviation 
Regulations require passenger compli-
ance with the lighted passenger infor-
mation signs and posted placards. The 
briefing shall also include a statement 
that Federal law prohibits tampering 
with, disabling, or destroying any 
smoke detector in an airplane lavato-
ry. 
(ii) The location of emergency exits. 
(hi) The use of safety belts including 
instructions on how to fasten and un-
fasten the safety belt. 
(iv) The location and use of any re-
quired emergency flotation means. 
(2) After each takeoff, immediately 
before or immediately after turning 
the seat belt sign off, an announce-
ment shall be made that passengers 
should keep their seat belts fastened, 
while seated, even when the seat belt 
sign is off. 
(3) Except as provided in paragraph 
(a)(4) of this section, before each take-
off a flight attendant assigned to the 
flight shall conduct an individual 
briefing of each person who may need 
the assistance of another person to 
move expeditiously to an exit in the 
event of an emergency. In the briefing 
the flight attendant shall— 
(i) Brief the person and his attend-
ant. if any, on the routes to each ap-
propriate exit and on the most appro-
priate time to begin moving to an exit 
in the event of an emergency; and 
(ii) Inquire of the person and his at-
tendant, if any, as to the most appro-
priate manner of assisting the person 
so as to prevent pain and further 
injury. 
(4) The requirements of paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section do not apply to a 
person who has been given a briefing 
before a previous leg of a flight in the 
same aircraft when the flight attend-
ants on duty have been advised as to 
the most appropriate manner of assist-
ing the person so as to prevent pain 
and further injury. 
(b) Each certificate holder shall 
carry on each passenger-carrying air-
plane, in convenient locations for use 
of each passenger, printed cards sup-
plementing the oral briefing and con-
taining— 
(1) Diagrams of, and methods of op-
erating, the emergency exits; and 
(2) Other instructions necessary for 
use of emergency equipment. 
Each card required by this paragraph 
must contain information that is perti-
nent only to the type and model air-
plane used for that flight. 
(c) The certificate holder shall de-
scribe in its manual the procedure to 
be followed in the briefing required by 
paragraph (a) of this section. 
[Amdt. 121-2, 30 FR 3206, Mar. 9, 1965, as 
amended by Amdt. 121-30, 32 FR 13268, 
Sept. 20, 1967; Amdt. 121-84, 37 FR 3975, 
Feb. 24. 1972; Amdt. 121-133, 42 FR 18394, 
Apr. 7, 1977; Amdt. 121-144, 43 FR 22648, 
May 25, 1978; Amdt. 121-146, 43 FR 28403, 
June 29, 1978; Amdt. 121-196, 53 FR 12362, 
Apr. 13, 1988] 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
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§121.585 Exit row seating. 
(d) Each certificate holder shall include 
on passenger information cards, presented 
in the languages used by the certificate 
holder for passenger information cards, 
at each seat affected by this section. In-
formation that. In the event of an emer-
gency In which a crew member is not 
available to assist, a passenger occupying 
an exit row seat may use if called upon to 
perform the following functions: 
(1) Locate the emergency exit; 
(2) Recognize the emergency exit open-
ng mechanism; 
(3) Comprehend the instructions for 
Dperattng the emergency exit; 
(4) Operate the emergency exit; 
(5) Assess whether opening the emer-
gency exit will Increase the hazards to 
which passengers may be exposed; 
(6) Follow oral directions and hand 
signals given by a crewmember; 
(7) Stow or secure the emergency exit 
door so that it will not impede use of the 
exit; 
(8) Assess the condition of an escape 
slide, activate the slide, and stabilize the 
slide after deployment to assist others In 
getting off the slide; 
(9) Pass expeditiously through the 
emergency exit; and 
(lOj Assess, select, and follow a safe 
path away from the emergency exit. 
(e) Each certificate holder shall include 
on passenger information cards, presented 
In the languages used by the certificate 
holder for passenger Information cards, 
at all seats affected by this section, the 
selection criteria set forth in paragraph (b) 
of this section, and a request that a pas-
senger Identify himself or herself to allow 
reseating if he or she: 
(1) Cannot meet the selection criteria 
set forth In paragraph (b) of this section; 
(2) Has a nondiscernible condition that 
will prevent him or her from performing 
the applicable functions listed in para-
graph (d) of this section; 
(3) May suffer bodily harm as the result 
of performing one or more of those func-
tions; or, 
(4) Does not wish to perform those 
functions. 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
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APPENDIX B 
FAR PART 135.117 AND FAR PART 135.129 (d) AND (e) 
§135.117 Briefing of passengers before flight. 
(a) Before each takeoff each pilot in 
command of an aircraft carrying pas-
sengers shall ensure that all passen-
gers have been orally briefed on— 
(1) Smoking. Each passenger shall 
be briefed on when, where, and under 
what conditions smoking is prohibited 
(including, but not limited to, the per-
tinent requirements"^ part 252 of this 
title). This briefing ^shall include a 
statement that the Federal Aviation 
Regulations require passenger compli-
ance with the lighted passenger infor-
mation signs (if such signs are re-
quired) and posted placards. The brief-
ing shall also include a statement (if 
the aircraft is equipped with a lavato-
ry) that Federal law prohibits tamper-
ing with, disabling, or destroying any 
smoke detector installed in an aircraft 
lavatory. 
(2) Use of seat belts; 
(3) The placement of seat backs in 
an upright position before takeoff and 
landing; 
(4) Location and means for opening 
^e passenger entry door and emer-
gency exits; 
(5) Location of survival equipment; 
.J(6) If the flight involves extended 
qyerwater operation, ditching proce-
dures and the use of required flotation 
equipment; 
(7) If the flight involves operations 
above 12,000 feet MSL, the normal 
and emergency use of oxygen; and 
(8) Location and operation of fire ex-
tinguishers. 
(b) Before each takeoff the pilot in 
command shall ensure that each 
person who may need the assistance of 
another person to move expeditiously 
to an exit if an emergency occurs and 
that person's attendant, if any, has re-
ceived a briefing as to the procedures 
to be followed if an evacuation occurs. 
This paragraph does not apply to a 
person who has been given a briefing 
before a previous leg of a flight in the 
same aircraft. 
(c) The oral briefing required by 
paragraph (a) of this section shall be 
given by the pilot in command or a 
crewmember. 
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraph (c) of this section, for 
aircraft certificated to carry 19 passen-
gers or less, the oral briefing required 
by paragraph (a) of this section shall 
be given by the pilot in command, a 
crewmember, or other qualified person 
designated by the certificate holder 
and approved by the Administrator. 
(e) The oral briefing required by 
paragraph (a) shall be supplemented 
by printed cards which must be car-
ried in the aircraft in locations con-
venient for the use of each passenger. 
The cards must— 
(1) Be appropriate for the aircraft 
on which they are to be used; 
(2) Contain a diagram of, and 
method of operating, the emergency 
exits; and 
(3) Contain other instructions neces-
sary for the use of emergency equip-
ment on board the aircraft. 
(O The briefing required by para-
graph (a) may be delivered by means 
of an approved recording playback 
device that is audible to each passen-
ger under normal noise levels. 
tt>oc. No. 16097. 43 FR 46783, Oct. 10, 1978. 
** amended by Amdt. 135-9, 51 FR 40709, 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 
§ 135.129 Exit row seating. 
(d) Each certificate holder shall in-
clude on passenger information cards, 
presented in the languages used by 
the certificate holder for passenger in-
formation cards, at each seat affected 
by this section, information that, in 
the event of an emergency in which a 
crewmember is not available to assist, 
a passenger occupying an exit row seat 
may be called upon to perform the fol-
lowing functions: 
(1) Locate the emergency exit; 
(2) Recognize the emergency exit 
opening mechanism; 
(3) Comprehend the instructions for 
operating the emergency exit; 
(4) Operate the emergency exit; 
(5) Assess whether opening the 
emergency exit will increase the haz-
ards to which passengers may be ex-
posed; 
(6) Follow oral directions and hand 
signals given by a crewmember; 
(7) Stow or secure the emergency 
exit door so that it will not impede use 
of the exit; 
(8) Assess the condition of an escape 
slide, activate the slide, and stabilize 
the slide after deployment to assist 
others in getting off the slide; 
(9) Pass expeditiously through the 
emergency exit; and 
(10) Assess, select, and follow a safe 
path away from the emergency exit. 
(e) Each certificate holder shall in-
clude on passenger information cards, 
presented in the languages used by 
the certificate holder for passenger in-
formation cards, at all seats affected 
by this section, the selection criteria 
set forth in paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion, and a request that a passenger 
identify himself or herself to allow re-
seating if her or she: 
(1) Cannot meet the selection crite-
ria set forth in paragraph (b) of this 
section; 
(2) Has a nondiscernible condition 
that will prevent him or her from per-
forming the applicable functions listed 
in paragraph (d) of this section; 
(3) May suffer bodily harm as the 
result of performing one or more of 
those functions; or, 
(4) Does not wish to perform those 
functions. 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
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APPENDIX C 
SAFETY CARD SAMPLE - DATA 
I Airline 
| Euroberlin Prance 
I Hapag-Lloyd 
1 Hapag-Lloyd 
LTU 
| Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
1 Lufthansa 
| Lufthansa 
1 Cathay Pacific 
| Icelandair 
| Garoda Indonesia 
| Luxair 
KLM 
| Air Portugal 
1 Singapore Airlines 
1 Singapore Airlines 
| Swissair 
| Swissair 
| British Airways 
Air Berlin USA 
| American 
| American 1 
Continental 
Continental 
| Continental 
Conlinental 
Continental I 
Continental 
Conlincnlal | 
Delta 
• Delia 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta 
Delta | 
1 Aircraft Type 
11737 
A310-300 
A3W-300 
MD-11 
A300 
A300 
A310 
A320 
B737 
B747 
B747 
DC-10 
B747-300 
B757-200 
A300 B4-220 
B737-100 
B747 
B737-200 
A310 
B747-400 
B747 
F100 
B747-400 
B737-300 
B727-223 
Super 80 
A300 
B7 27-100 
B727-200 
B737-200/300 
DC-9-30 
DC-9-80 
DC-9-80 
A310-200/300 
B727-2O0 
B737-200/300 
B7S7 
B767-300 
B767-300ER 
DC-9-32 
L-10U 
MD-11 
MD-88 1 
1 Country 
| France 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
| Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Singapore 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
U.K. 
U.S A. 
U.S A. 
U S A 
U S A 
US.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S A. 
US.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 
U.S.A. 1 
1 Year 
1988 
N / A 
N / A 
N / A 
1989 
1990 
1989 
N / A 
1989 
1990 
1989 
N / A 
N / A 
N / A 
I N / A 
N / A 
1985 
1983 
N / A 
N / A 
1990 
1990 
N / A 
N / A 
N / A 
1987 
1990 
1988 
1990 
1987 
1989 
1987 
1990 
1991 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1990 1 
Diagrams 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Diagrams 
& (Words 
0 
1 l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Words Sc 
\ (Diagrams) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 Words 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Photos 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 o 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Color I Multiple 
1 Languages 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 Translated 
1 Instructions 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 Over-wing 
1 Exit Door 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
4 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
o 1 1 | 3 | 
I Shoes 1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 1 
(Continued on Next Page) 
Note. Explanation of Coding: • Year N/A: Unknown 
• Design Features: 0: Not Used 1: Used on Card 
• Over-wing Exit Door 0: Not Mentioned 1: On Seats in Front 2: Outside 3: On Seats in Exit Row 4: On Scats Behind 
• Shoes: 0: Nol Menlioned 1: Remove All Shoes 2: Remove High-Heels Shoes 
(Continued from Previous Page) 
1 Airline 
| Eastern 
| Eastern 
| Eastern 
| Eastern 
| Northwest 
| Northwest 
| Northwest 
| Northwest 
1 Pan Am 
| Pan Am 
| Pan Am 
| Southwest 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
TWA 
1 TWA 
U S Air 
US Air 
1 United 
United 
United 
United | 
1 Aircraft Type 
B727-200 
DC-^-31 
DC-9-32 
DC-9-51 
B727-100 
B727-200 
B727-200 
1 DC-9-30/50 
A310 
11727 
! 11727 
11737 
B727-231 
B727-31 
B747 
B767 
B767 
1X1-9-80 
DC-9 80 
DC-9-80 
L-1011 
L-1011 
L-1011-100 
B737-200/300 
F100 
B727 Wretch 
B727-200 
B737 
DC-10 1 
| Country 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
! U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 1 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
U S A 
USA J 
1 Year 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
N / A 
1989 
1991 
N / A 
1990 
1990 
N / A 
1990 
1981 
19S1 
1988 
1991 
1988 
198S 
1990 
1991 
1987 
1991 
198/ 
1990 
1990 
1988 
1991 
19S1 
198f, 1 
1 Diagrams 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Diagrams 
& (Words) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
o 
1 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
u 1 0 
0 
1 
0 | 
o 1 
1 Words & 
1 (Diagrams) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I ° 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 j 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
o 1 
I Words 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
u 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
1 Photos 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 1 
1 Color 1 Multiple 
j Languages 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 Translated 
| Instructions 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 Over-wing 
| Exit Door 
3 
3 
3 
3 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
3 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
0
 1 
1 Shoe* 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
o 1 
Note. Explanation of Coding* • Yean N/A Unknown 
• Design Features 0 Nol Used 1 Used on Card 
• Over-wing Exit Door 0 Nol Menlioned 1 On Seals in Tronl 2 Outside 3 On Seals in Exit Row 4* On Seals Behind 
• Shoes 0 Nol Menlioned 1 Remove All Shoes 2 Remove High-Heels Shoes 
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APPENDIX D 
ENGLISH TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE 
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL) 
A v / i a t i o n S a f e t y T e s t 
Thank you f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s a v i a t i o n s a f e t y t e s t . 
The data d e r i v e d from t h i s s tudy w i l l h e l p t o deve lop improved 
s a f e t y equipment and p r o c e d u r e s aboard commercial a i r c r a f t . 
P l e a s e unders tand t h a t your answers w i l l be h e l d in s t r i c t e s t 
c o n f i d e n c e . No i n d i v i d u a l data w i l l be r e l e a s e d . 
P l e a s e do n o t s i g n your name on t h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e . 
PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY, AND ANSWER SUCH WHICH BEST 
REPRESENTS YOU AND YOUR OPINIONS. 
PASSENGER SAFETY INFORMATION BRIEFING CARDS ARE INTENDED TO GIVE AIRCRAFT 
PASSENGERS GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE EMERGENCIES. THE CARDS 
ARE REQUIRED BY LAW IN MOST COUNTRIES. THE CARDS CAN USUALLY BE FOUND IN THE 
SEAT POCKET IN FRONT OF EACH PASSENGER. 
1 a) Have you ever flown on a commercial 
a i r c ra f t / on an air l iner ? yes no 
IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED 1 a) UITH "NO", PLEASE SKIP THE FOLLDUING QUESTIONS AND 
PROCEED DIRECTLY TO QUESTION 2. 
1 b) How of ten do you usually f l y on a commercial about once or twice 
a i r c ra f t per year ? several times 
about each month 
1 c) Uhen did you f l y last as a passenger on a i e s s t n a n a m o n t h ago 
commercial a i r c ra f t ?
 l e s s t n a n a y g a r a g o 
more than a year ago 
1 d) On your latest f l i gh t , did you read the passenger yes no 
safety information br ief ing card ? 
1 e) I f you did not read the safety card on your la test |< n e w i ts contents 
f l igh t , why ? did not want to 
could not f ind i t 
QUESTION 2: 
If you were asked to design a passenger safety information br ief ing card. 
which three features would you put the most emphasis on ? 
Using the numbers 1, 2. and 3. wi th 1 indicating the most important item, please 
select the three features that would be most important to you. 
a) Drawings 
b) Photographs 
c) Durabil i ty of the card 
d) Use of d i f fe rent languages 
e) Mult i-colored 
f) Size of the card 
g) Uords/Urit ing 
QUESTION 3: 
On this and the following pages, you will f ind graphics which are similar to those 
used on actual passenger safety information briefing cards. 
For each of the symbols presented, please describe in a few words what you think 
they represent most l ikely. 
Example: 
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l y ^ H l l l j j ^ 
QUESTION U 
Let us assume you had to open an emergency exi t 
during an a i r c ra f t evacuation, as indicated to the 
r ight . 
UHERE UOULD YOU LEAVE THE DOOR ONCE REMOVED 
FROM THE FRAME ? 
UOULD YOU PUT IT: 
a) on the seat in f ron t of you, as in i l lustrat ion A 
b) throw i t outside the plane, as in i l lustrat ion B 
c) on the seats in your row, as in i l lustrat ion C 
d) on the seats in the row behind you, as in i l lustrat ion D 
Tx~n nrm 
QUESTION 5: 
Lights on the f loor along the aisle provide guidance to exi ts. 
5 a) Uhat color most l ikely indicates an exi t ? 
white yellow red green blue _ 
5 b) In your opinion, what color should be used to mark an exi t ? 
white yellow red green blue _ 
QUESTION 6: 
6 a) You are female male 
6 b) Your age is under 30 30 to 60 over 60 
6 c) Your nat ive language is 
6 d) Your home country is 
6 e) You are now studying in (country) _____ 
6 f) Your major is 
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APPENDIX E 
TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE: FRENCH VERSION 
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL) 
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T e s t i T Q l a t i - F ^ l a s f e c _ j i " i t :£> a e r i e n n e p a s s a g e r 
Merci de b i e n v o u l o i r p a r t i c i p e r _ c e t t e e n q u e t e . C e l l e - g i a pour 
but d ' a m e l i o r e r l e s procedures e t panneaux de s e c u r i t e a bord d es 
a v i o n s de t r a n s p o r t p a s s a g e r . V e u i l l e z e t r e a s s u r e que v o s r e p o n s e s 
s e r o n t u t i l i s e e s de maniere c o n f i d e n t i e l l e . Aucune donn6e ne s e r a 
p u b l i e e i n d i v i d u e l l e m e n t . 
S ' i l vous p l a i t ne s i g n e z pas c e q u e s t i o n n a i r e . 
VEUILLEZ LIRE ATTENTIVEMENT CE QUESTIONNAIRE, ET REPONDRE DE TELLE 
MANIERE A CE QUE VOS REPONSES REFLETENT LE PLUS PRECISEMENT VOTRE 
OPINION. 
LES CARTES DE SECURITE DANS LES AVIONS ONT POUR BUT DE FOURNIR AUX PASSAGERS 
DIRECTIONS ET INFORMATIONS DANS L'EVENTUALITE D'UNE URGENCE. LA LEGISLATION 
DANS PLUSIEURS PAYS EXIGE QUE CES CARTES DE SECURITE 50IENT A BORD AVANT CHAQUE 
VOL. CELLE-CI SONT NORMALLEMENT SITUEES DANS LA POCHE AU DOS DE 
CHAQUE SIEGE. 
1 a) Avez-vous deja voyag6 dans un avion 
de t ranspor t passager ? oui non 
EN CAS DE REPONSE NEGATIVE A CETTE QUESTION, PASSEZ DIRECTEMENT A LA 
QUESTION NO. 2. 
1 b) Prenez-vous souvent l'avion ? une ou deux fois par an 
plusieures fois par an 
a peu pres tous les mois 
1 c) Quand est-ce que vous avez pris 11 y a moins d'un mois 
l 'avion pour la derniere fois ? II y a moins d'un an 
II y a plus d'un an 
1 d) Lors de vot re dernier voyage en avion, 
avez-vous iu la car te de s_curit§ passager? oui non 
1 e) Si vous n'avez pas lu la car te de j ' en connaissais le contenu 
s_curit_ passager lors de votre dernier je n'en avais pas envie 
vol , d i tes pourquoi. je ne Tai pas trouvGe 
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QUESTION NO. 2: 
Si l'on vous demandait de concevoir une carte de s6curi t§ passager, sur quelles 
t ro is caract_r ist iques mettriez-vous le plus l 'accent ? 
Veuillez indiquer les t ro is plus importantes caract§rist iques par 1, 2 et 3 
(1 repr§sentant la plus importante). 
a) Dessins/Symbol/Graphique 
b) Photos 
c) Durabil i ty de la car te 
d) Di f f6rentes langues 
e) Di f ferentes couleurs 
f ) Dimensions de la car te 
g) Mots/R§daction 
QUESTION NO. 3: 
Sur ce t te page et les suivantes, vous trouverez des graphiques similaires a ceux 
que l'on peut t rouver sur rie reelles cartes de securi ty passager. 
Pour chacun des symbols suivants, veuillez decrire, en quelque mots, quelle est, 
pour vous, leur s igni f icat ion. 
Example: 
ln^rdicUon de funngr le cigar ou 
la pip^-
139 
140 
141 
iv\ |j ~ 8 B _ J I _ I ^ I 
oJK_ 
L_i_ )r 
QUESTION NO. U: 
Imaginons que vous deviez ouvrir une issue de 
secours sur le cot§ dro i t 
lors de l '§vacuation d'un avion, 
QU'ALLEZ VOUS FAIRE DE LA PORTE ? 
ALLEZ-VOUS LA 
a) mettre sur le si£ge devant vous, comme indiqu§ par la f igure A 
b) je te r a l 'exter ieure, comme indique par la f igure B 
c) mettre sur le si&ge a c6t§ de vous, comme indique par la f igure C 
d) mettre sur le si£ge derri&re vous, comme indiquG par la f igure D 
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QUESTION NO. 5: 
Le "sentier" lumineux le long des allees a pour but d'indiquer les issues de secours. 
5 a) Quelle est la couleur qui vraissemblablement indique une issue de secours ? 
blanc jaune rouge ver t bleu 
5 b) A vot re avis, quelle couleur devrai t e t re uti l isee pour indiquer une issue de secours ? 
blanc jaune rouge ver t bleu 
QUESTION NO. 6: 
6 a) sexe feminin masculin 
6 b) age moins de 30 ans de 30 a 60 ans plus de 60 ans 
6 c) Quelle est votre langue maternelle 
6 d) Quel est vot re pays d'origine 
6 e) Dans quel pays effectuez-vous vos etudes 
6 f) Dans quelle speciality 
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APPENDIX F 
TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE: GERMAN VERSION 
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL) 
L u - P t - P a t n r - t L S i c h e r h e i t s - T e s t 
Vielen Dank fUr Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Luftfahrt Sicherheits-
Test. Die Daten von dieser Studie werden dazu beitragen, neue 
und verbesserte Sicherheitsausrilstungen und -prozeduren filr 
Passagierflugzeuge zu entwickeln. 
Ihre Antworten werden streng vertraulich behandelt. Keine 
individuellen Daten werden veroffentlicht. 
Bitte schreiben Sie nicht Ihren Namen auf diesen Fragebogen. 
BITTE LESEN SIE ALLE FRAGEN AUFMERKSAM UND ANTWORTEN SO, DASS 
IHRE MEINUNGEN AM BESTEN WIEDERGEGEBEN WERDEN. 
SICHERHEITSKARTEN FUR FLUGPASSAGIERE SIND DAZU GEDACHT, RICHTLINIEN UND 
INFORMATIONEN FUR EVENTUELLE NOTFALLE ZU GEBEN. IN DEN MEISTEN LANDERN 
SIND SIE PER GESETZ VORGESCHRIEBEN. DIE KARTEN BEFINDEN SICH NORMALERUEISE 
IN DEN SITZTASCHEN VOR JEDEM PASSAGIER. 
1 a) Sind Sie jemals als Passagier in einem 
Verkehrsflugzeug geflogen ? ja nein 
UENN SIE FRAGE 1 a) MIT "NEIN" BEANTWORTET HABEN, UBERSPRINGEN SIE BITTE DIE 
FOLGENDEN FRAGEN UND GEHEN SIE DIREKT ZU FRAGE 2 UBER. 
1 b) Uie o f t f l iegen Sie normalerweise pro Jahr 
als Passagier in Verkehrsflugzeugen ? 
1 c) Uann sind Sie das letzte Mai als Passagier in 
einem Verkehrsflugzeug geflogen ? 
1 d) Uahrend Ihres letzten Fluges, haben Sie die 
Sicherheitskarte fu r Flugpassagiere gelesen ? 
1 e) Falls Sie die Sicherheitskarte wahrend lhres 
letzten Fluges nicht gelesen haben, warum ? 
c i rca ein- bis zweimal 
mehrmals 
etwa jeden Monat 
vor weniger als einem Monat 
vor weniger als einem Jahr 
vor mehr als einem Jahr 
ja nein 
kannte den Inhalt 
wol l te nicht 
konnte Karte n icht f inden 
FRAGE 2: 
Uenn Sie gebeten wurden, eine Sicherheits-lnformations-Karte fur Flugpassagiere zu 
entwerfen, welche drei Charakterist ika wurden Sie fu r besonders wichtig halten ? 
Bi t te markieren Sie die drei wichtigsten Eigenschaften mit den Zi f fern 1, 2 und 3, 
wobei 1 das wichtigste Charakteristikum angibt. 
a) Zeichnungen/Piktogramme 
b) Photos 
c) Haltbarkeit/Langlebigkeit der Karte 
d) Benutzung mehrerer Sprachen 
e) Mehrfarbig 
f ) GroBe der Karte 
g) Worte/Schri f t 
FRAGE 3: 
Auf dieser und den folgenden Seiten finden Sie Symbole, die solchen auf heutigen 
Sicherheitskarten fu r Flugpassagiere ahneln. 
Fur jedes der abgebildeten Symbole, beschreiben Sie b i t te in wenigen LJorten, was 
nach Ihrer Meinung die wahrscheinlichste Bedeutung der Zeichnungen ist. 
Beispiel: 
D a s t<ciuchcn von 'Z.iopyrem unci 
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FRAGE 4 : 
Angenommen, Sie mGBten wahrend einer 
Flugzeug-Evakuierung einen Notausgang offnen, 
so wie rechts dargestel l t . 
UIO WURDEN SIE DIE TUR DES NOTAUSGANGS LASSEN, 
NACHDEM SIE SIE AUS DEM RAHMEN GEHOBEN HABEN ? 
a) auf die Sitze vor Ihnen, so wie in Abbildung A 
b) aus dem Flugzeug, so wie in Abbildung B 
c) auf die Sitze in Ihrer Sitzreihe, so wie in Abbildung C 
d) auf die Sitze der Reihe hinter Ihnen, wie in Abbildung D 
r£TiT, 
FRAGE 5: 
Leuchten am Boden im Mittelgang fuhren zu den Notausgangen. 
5 a) Uielche Farbe zeigt am wahrscheinlichsten einen Notausgang an ? 
weiB gelb ro t grun blau 
5 b) Nach Ihrer Meinung, welche Farbe sollte benutzt werden, um einen 
Ausgang zu markieren ? 
weiB gelb ro t grun blau 
FRAGE 6: 
6 a) Sie sind weiblich mannhch 
6 b) Sie sind unter 30 30 bis 60 uber 60 Jahre a l t 
6 c) ihre Muttersprache ist 
6 d) lhr Heimatland ist 
6 e) Sie studieren zur Zeit in (Land) 
6 f ) lhr Studienfach ist 
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APPENDIX G 
FAR PART 91.21 
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§ 91.21 Portable electronic devices. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph 
(b) of this section, no person may op-
erate, nor may any operator or pilot in 
command of an aircraft allow the op-
eration of, any portable electronic 
device on any of the following U.S.-
registered civil aircraft: 
(1) Aircraft operated by a holder of 
an air carrier operating certificate or 
an operating certificate; or 
(2) Any other aircraft while it is op-
erated under IFR. 
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section 
does not apply to— 
(1) Portable voice recorders; 
(2) Hearing aids; 
(3) Heart pacemakers; 
(4) Electric shavers; or 
(5) Any other portable electronic 
device that the operator of the air-
craft has determined will not cause in-
terference with the navigation or com-
munication system of the aircraft on 
which it is to be used. 
(c) In the case of an aircraft operat-
ed by a holder of an air carrier operat-
ing certificate or an operating certifi-
cate, the determination required by 
paragraph (b)(5) of this section shall 
be made by that operator of the air-
craft on which the particular device is 
to be used. In the case of other air-
craft, the determination may be made 
by the pilot in command or other op-
erator of the aircraft. 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
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APPENDIX H 
PICTOGRAMS AND THEIR SOURCES 
Pictogram 1 (EXITl): 
U.S. AirB-737-200/300 
Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl): 
Continental DC-9-30 
Continental DC-9-80 
Continental B737-200/300 
Continental B727-100/200 
Pictogram 3 (HEELSl): 
Euroberlin France B737 
Cathay Pacific B747-300 
Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN): 
United Airlines B-727-200 (new 
Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl): 
PAN AM B727 
PAN AM A310 
Pictogram 6 (HEELS2): 
LUXAIR B737-200 
Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG): 
Lufthansa (all cards) 
Hapag-LJoyd A310 
LTU MD-11 
Pictogram 8 (SLIDE2): 
United Airlines B727-200 
.-J 
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T t f tMa^H 
Pictogram 9 (DITCH); 
Lufthansa (all cards) 
Eastern Airlines B727-200 
Eastern Airlines DC-9-31 /51 
Pictogram 10 (HEELS3) 
Garuda Indonesia A300 
Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG): 
Continental Airlines (all cards) 
Singapore Airlines A310/B747-400 
Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02): 
Continental Airlines (numerous 
cards) 
Pictogram 13 (BUTANE): 
U.S. Air B737-200/300 
U.S. Air F100 
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APPENDIX I 
TEST INSTRUCTIONS IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN 
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL) 
Instructions for Test: Super- v i sor»s 
Thank you for allocating your time to participate in this study. 
Instructions: 
1. Please hand out the test to the students. Please assure that every 
student receives his/her own copy. 
2. Please read the following instructions to the students: 
This test is part of a study for a Master's Thesis in aviation. The test 
in front of you is given to students in several countries worldwide. 
Thank you for your participation and cooperation. 
Your answers to the test will be anonymous. Therefore, please do not sign 
your name anywhere on the test. 
You have 15 minutes to complete the test which should be ample. I will 
inform you after 10 minutes that 5 minutes are left to finish the test. 
Please read each question carefully, and answer in such a way which best 
represents you and your opinions. Please give professional answers in 
order to make this study a success. Please answer the test in (your 
country's language, here: English). Thank you, please start now. 
3. Start the time. 
4. After 10 minutes, please read the following statement: 
10 minutes are up, you have 5 more minutes to complete the test. Please 
try to answer all questions. Please make sure that you answer question 6. 
5. When 15 minutes from start have passed, please read the following: 
15 minutes are up, please stop answering. Turn to the last page of the 
test and make sure that you have answered question 6. If you have not yet 
answered question 6, please do so now. 
6. Please collect all answer sheets. 
Put the tests in and seal the enclosed return envelope. 
7. Send the tests to the following address (as on the return envelopes): 
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch 
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR) 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 
U.S.A. 
Please use air mail and indicate "documents" on the letter for customs 
purposes. 
Again, thank you very much for your help. 
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In^trMCtipp POUT le sur-vei 1 lant 
Merci de prendre le temps de participer a cette etude. 
Instructions: 
1. Veuillez distribuer le test. Assurez-vouz que chaque etudiant recoive un 
exemplaire. 
2. Veuillez lire les instructions suivantes aux etudiants: 
Ce test rentre dans le cadre d'une these de Master en aviation. Le 
questionnaire que vous avez devant vous a ete traduit en differente 
langues et va etre complete par des etudiants de differents pays. 
Merci pour votre participation. 
Les reponses a ce test sont anonymes. Vous etes done pri6s de ne pas 
mentionner votre non. 
Vous avez 15 minutes pour completer ce questionnaire, ce qui devrait 
etre amplement suffisant. Je vous avertirai quand il ne restera plus que 
5 minutes. Veuillez lire attentivement chaque question, et repondre de 
telle maniere a ce que vos reponses refletent le plus precisement votre 
opinion. Soyez le plus professionel que possible afin d' assurer le succes 
de cette etude. Repondez a ce test en frangais. 
Merci. Vous pouvez commencer maintenant. 
3. Commencer le chronometrage. 
4. Apres 10 minutes, veuillez lire aux etudiants ce qui suit: 
II vous reste 5 minutes. Essayer de repondre a toutes les questions. 
Assurez-vous que vous avez repondu a 7a question no. 6. 
5. Une fois les 15 minutes ecoulees veuillez lire ce qui suit: 
Les 15 minutes sont passees, veuillez arreter d'ecrire. Verifiez que vous 
avez bien repondu a la question no. 6 a la derniere page du questionnaire. 
Si vous n'avez pas complete cette question, veuillez le faire maintenant. 
6. Veuillez rammasser les questionnaires. 
Veuillez mettre les tests dans l'enveloppe et la fermer. 
7. Veuillez envoyer cette enveloppe a l'adresse suivante: 
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch 
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR) 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 
U.S.A. 
Assurez-vous que ce courrier est envoys "par avion" et indiquez "documents" 
sur l'enveloppe pour faciliter le passage de la douane. 
Une fois encore, mes sincferes remerciements pour votre aide. 
Instruktionen -Fur- den Test: 
Vielen Dank fur die Zeit und Muhe, die Sie diesem Projekt widmen. 
Instruktionen: 
1. Bitte verteilen Sie den Test an die Studenten. Bitte stellen Sie sicher, 
daB jeder Student/jede Studentin je eigene Fragebogen erhalt. 
2. Bitte lesen Sie den Studenten die folgenden Instruktionen vor: 
Dieser Test ist Teil einer Diplomarbeit in Luft- und Raumfahrttechnik. 
Der Test vor Ihnen wird Studenten in mehreren Landern weltweit gegeben. 
Vielen Dank fur Ihre Teilnahme und Kooperation. 
Ihre Antworten zu diesem Test sind anonym. Schreiben Sie daher nicht 
lhren Namen auf die Fragebogen. 
Sie haben 15 Minuten, um den Test zu beantworten, was mehr als genug 
Zeit sein sollte. Nach 10 Minuten werde ich Sie darauf hinweisen, daB 
funf Minuten verbleiben, um den Test zu vervoil standigen. 
Bitte lesen Sie alle Fragen aufmerksam, und antworten Sie so, daB Sie 
und Ihre Meinungen am besten wiedergegeben sind. Bitte geben Sie 
professionelle Antworten, um diese Studie zu einem Erfolg zu machen. 
Bitte antworten Sie in Deutsch. Vielen Dank, beginnen Sie jetzt. 
3. Starten Sie die Zeit. 
4. Bitte lesen Sie die folgenden Satze, nachdem 10 Minuten um sind: 
10 Minuten sind um, 5 Minuten verbleiben, um den Test zu beenden. 
Bitte versuchen Sie, alle Fragen zu beantworten. Bitte stellen Sie 
sicher, daB Sie Frage 6 beantworten. 
5. 15 Minuten nach Beginn, verlesen Sie bitte das Folgende: 
15 Minuten sind um, bitte beenden Sie den Test. Schlagen Sie die letzte 
Seite des Tests auf, und uberprufen Sie, ob Sie Frage 6 beantwortet haben. 
Uenn Sie Frage 6 noch nicht beantwortet haben, tun Sie das bitte jetzt. 
6. Bitte sammeln Sie alle Fragebogen ein. 
Tun Sie die Tests in den beigelegten Ruckumschlag und schlieBen Sie ihn. 
7. Senden Sie den Test an die folgende Adresse (wie auf dem Ruckumschlag): 
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch 
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR) 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 
U.S.A. 
Bitte benutzen Sie Luftpost und schreiben Sie "Dokumente" in die 
Zollerklarung. 
Nochmals, vielen Dank fur Ihre Hilfe. 
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APPENDIX J 
TEST RESULTS FOR THE 13 PICTOGRAMS 
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TABLE OF EXITl 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
3 
12 
12 
27 
EXITl 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
11.11 
44.44 
44.44 
100.00 
27 
SLIDEl 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
1 
26 
27 
SLIDEl 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
14 
16 
7 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
37.84 
43.24 
18.92 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
0 
2 
35 
37 
(ROWS) 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
1 
35 
13 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
2.04 
71.43 
26.53 
100.00 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
3 
12 
34 
49 
LANGUAGES 
US 
US 
64. 
27, 
100 
US 
(COLUMNS) 
3 
24 
10 
37 
TOTAL 
21 
87 
42 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
.11 
.86 
.03 
.00 
37 
TOTAL 
14.00 
58.00 
28.00 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
3 
4 
30 
37 
TOTAL 
6 
19 
125 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
N 
21.00 
87.00 
42.00 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
M 
BRITISH 
.00 
3.70 
96.30 
100.00 
27 
FRENCH 
.00 
5.41 
94.59 
100.00 
37 
GERMAN 
6.12 
24.49 
69.39 
100.00 
49 
US 
8.11 
10.81 
81.08 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
4.00 
12.67 
83.33 
100.00 
150 
N 
6.00 
19.00 
125.00 
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TABLE OF HEELSl 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
3 
24 
27 
HEELSl 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
FREQUENC] 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
.00 
11.11 
88.89 
100.00 
27 
OXYGEN 
[ES 
BRITISH 
1 
1 
25 
27 
OXYGEN 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
3.70 
3.70 
92.59 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
1 
10 
26 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
2.70 
27.03 
70.27 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
1 
1 
35 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
2.70 
2.70 
94.59 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
4 
6 
39 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
8.16 
12.24 
79.59 
100.00 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
2 
1 
46 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
4.08 
2.04 
93.88 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
1 
3 
33 
37 
TOTAL 
6 
22 
122 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
2.70 
8.11 
89.19 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
4.00 
14.67 
81.33 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
2 
1 
34 
37 
TOTAL 
6 
4 
140 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
5.41 
2.70 
91.89 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
4.00 
2.67 
93.33 
100.00 
150 
N 
6.00 
22.00 
122.00 
N 
6.00 
4.00 
140.00 
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TABLE OF ELECTROl 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
17 
10 
27 
ELECTROl 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
.00 
62.96 
37.04 
100.00 
27 
HEELS2 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
5 
6 
16 
27 
HEELS2 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
18.52 
22.22 
59.26 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
0 
12 
25 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
.00 
32.43 
67.57 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
1 
8 
28 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
2.70 
21.62 
75.68 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
1 
15 
33 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
2.04 
30.61 
67.35 
100.00 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
1 
11 
37 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
2.04 
22.45 
75.51 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
1 
28 
8 
37 
TOTAL 
2 
72 
76 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
2.70 
75.68 
21.62 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
1.33 
48.00 
50.67 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
2 
7 
28 
37 
TOTAL 
9 
32 
109 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
5.41 
18.92 
75.68 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
6.00 
21.33 
72.67 
100.00 
150 
N 
2.00 
72.00 
76.00 
N 
9.00 
32.00 
109.00 
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TABLE OF SMOKELIG 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
13 
14 
27 
SMOKELIG 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
.00 
48.15 
51.85 
100.00 
27 
SLIDE2 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
2 
25 
27 
SLIDE2 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
.00 
7.41 
92.59 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
6 
18 
13 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
16.22 
48.65 
35.14 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
3 
8 
26 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
8.11 
21.62 
70.27 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
10 
15 
24 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
20.41 
30.61 
48.98 
100.00 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
2 
8 
39 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
4.08 
16.33 
79.59 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
3 
26 
8 
37 
TOTAL 
19 
72 
59 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
8.11 
70.27 
21.62 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
12.67 
48.00 
39.33 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
4 
4 
29 
37 
TOTAL 
9 
22 
119 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
10.81 
10.81 
78.38 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
6.00 
14.67 
79.33 
100.00 
150 
N 
19.00 
72.00 
59.00 
N 
9.00 
22.00 
119.00 
TABLE OF DITCH 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
9 
14 
4 
27 
DITCH 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
33.33 
51.85 
14.81 
100.00 
27 
HEELS3 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
7 
12 
8 
27 
HEELS3 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
25.93 
44.44 
29.63 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
19 
14 
4 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
51.35 
37.84 
10.81 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
6 
20 
11 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
16.22 
54.05 
29.73 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
19 
23 
7 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
38.78 
46.94 
14.29 
100.00 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
5 
20 
24 
49 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
10.20 
40.82 
48.98 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
22 
11 
4 
37 
TOTAL 
69 
62 
19 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
59.46 
29.73 
10.81 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
46.00 
41.33 
12.67 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
10 
19 
8 
37 
TOTAL 
28 
71 
51 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
27.03 
51.35 
21.62 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
18.67 
47.33 
34.00 
100.00 
150 
N 
69.00 
62.00 
19.00 
N 
28.00 
71.00 
51.00 
TABLE OF FLOORLIG 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
3 
3 
21 
27 
FLOORLIG 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
11.11 
11.11 
77.78 
100.00 
27 
ELECTR02 
FREQUENCIES 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BRITISH 
0 
20 
7 
27 
ELECTR02 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
.00 
74.07 
25.93 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
8 
9 
20 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
21.62 
24.32 
54.05 
100.00 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
0 
29 
8 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
.00 
78.38 
21.62 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
4 
12 
33 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
8.16 
24.49 
67.35 
100.00 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
2 
27 
20 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
4.08 
55.10 
40.82 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
2 
10 
25 
37 
TOTAL 
17 
34 
99 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
5.41 
27.03 
67.57 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
11.33 
22.67 
66.00 
100.00 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
0 
35 
2 
37 
TOTAL 
2 
111 
37 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
.00 
94.59 
5.41 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
1.33 
74.00 
24.67 
100.00 
150 
N 
17.00 
34.00 
99.00 
N 
2.00 
111.00 
37.00 
169 
TABLE OF 
FREQUENC] 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
TABLE OF 
BUTANE 
[ES 
BRITISH 
0 
24 
3 
27 
BUTANE 
COLUMN PERCENTS 
-1.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
TOTAL 
N 
BRITISH 
.00 
88.89 
11.11 
100.00 
27 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
1 
36 
0 
37 
(ROWS) 
FRENCH 
2.70 
97.30 
.00 
100.00 
37 
BY LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
BY 
0 
44 
5 
49 
LANGUAGES 
GERMAN 
.00 
89.80 
10.20 
100.00 
49 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
0 
34 
3 
37 
TOTAL 
1 
138 
11 
150 
(COLUMNS) 
US 
.00 
91.89 
8.11 
100.00 
37 
TOTAL 
.67 
92.00 
7.33 
100.00 
150 
N 
1.00 
138.00 
11.00 
